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Since September 2001, health threats associated with acts of terrorism have 
become an area of increasing concern.  The Strategy for Homeland Security stresses the 
need for a robust public health component to quickly respond to and recover from attacks 
and other emergencies.  The assumption that public health is an optimal system that 
simply needs to be aimed in new directions is fundamentally flawed. Public health 
baseline requirements for responding to threats are not as well understood as they might 
be. The purpose of this research is to help establish a common and accurate measure for 
assessing the public health infrastructure. Using the case study of Union County, New 
Jersey this thesis surveys the activities public health agencies are expected to perform; 
compares performance to target objectives; and employs a manpower matrix as a model 
for determining staffing requirements for local public health.  This study argues that that 
the goal of sustainable funding for public health begins with an accurate measure of the 
capacities of the system in relation to demands placed upon it. Without such a measure 
public health will continue to fail in its primary functions and lack the capacity to meet 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There is an urgency to strengthen the public health infrastructure and define its 
role in homeland security but the question remains:  are policy makers willing to invest in 
public health so that gaps can be filled and an effective response mounted?  This is where 
the heart of the problem lies.  Our baseline requirements for responding to new threats are 
not as well understood as they should be. The lack of assessment is at the heart of many 
of our response inadequacies. The basic assumption is that public health is an optimal 
system that simply needs to be refocused and aimed in new directions. The fact is that 
well before September 11, 2001, public health agencies have not been a high priority for 
decades; lean state and local budgets have made matters worse and most health agencies 
are barely staffed to run during a normal 9-5 workday.1  Public Health simply does not 
have the manpower to get the job done.  “Nationally, the ratio of public health workers to 
the population has dropped from 219 per 100,000 in 1980 to 158 per 100,000 in 2,000.”2  
The purpose of this research is to assess the public health infrastructure in Union County, 
New Jersey.  There are forty-seven local public health professionals employed within ten 
local health departments.  This represents a ratio of nine public health workers per 
100,000 populations.  Based on this statistic, Union County is well below the national 
average in the public health workforce.  Public health will not be able to meet the 
demands of traditional health services and bioterrorism response if the baseline public 
health infrastructure is not realistically evaluated.  This paper will assess the many 
activities that public health agencies are expected to perform; compare actual 
performance to target objectives; and employ a manpower matrix to determine baseline 
staffing requirements for local public health departments.   
                                                 
1  Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How the U.S. has Failed to Secure the Homeland and 
Protect Us from Terrorism (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2004). 
2  Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 , Public Law 
Public Law 107-188 (2002), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ188.107.pdf (accessed February 3, 2006). 
2 
For decades, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has 
published objectives for a Healthy America.  These objectives map a strategy for 
reducing morbidity and mortality from preventable diseases.  For decades the public 
health community has been content to make small advances toward these objectives 
while thousands of Americans annually fall victim to these same diseases, almost as if 
they are “acceptable losses” in the disease prevention war.  The fallout of such an 
incremental approach has serious implications in terms of integrating homeland security 
imperatives with the more traditional roles of public health. The Strategy for Homeland 
Security stresses the need for a robust public health component to quickly respond to and, 
eventually recover from a biological attack.  This Strategy relies on the same 
infrastructure that has been incapable of meeting traditional core public health objectives. 
 It relies on an infrastructure that has been studied and found lacking both in capacity and 
capability vis-à-vis its workforce.  Without a serious effort to address the weaknesses in 
the public health infrastructure, it is unlikely that a strategy can be effectively crafted to 
meet the competing demands of public health preparedness at the federal, state and local 
levels. 
As the public health infrastructure is evaluated throughout this thesis, it is 
important to remember that public health is not representative of hospitals, emergency 
rooms or ambulances; it is the provider of last resort for an array of health services that 
have little to do with Homeland Security.  Homeland Security funding has been 
distributed citing “dual use functionality” and “all hazards” preparedness and yet public 
health has not been given the same opportunity to reach a preparedness level equivalent 
to police and fire responding agencies.  Public health must demand sustained funding and 
resources or public health will continue to fail its primary function and lack the capacity 
to meet Homeland Security goals.  
 
B. DEFINING THE THREAT 
Since the anthrax attacks of 2001, health threats associated with acts of terrorism 
have become one of many areas of increasing concern for both public health and 
homeland security professionals.  Confronting dangers posed by weapons of mass 
destruction, advanced biological weapons and natural threats presents a range of new 
3 
challenges to public health officials in their efforts to protect the health of the population. 
Threats posed by these events reveal that “public health remains the weakest link in 
homeland security”3 and the national homeland defense strategy.  
1. Origin of the Threat 
The origins of public health go back at least as far as Biblical times when 
Hebrews instituted dietary restrictions that may have been based upon an evolving sense 
of hygiene.  Many centuries later in 1374, port quarantine measures were imposed on 
new ship arrivals in Venice in efforts to stem the spread of Plague. On May 14, 1796, 
Edward Jenner performed public health’s most famous immunization by inoculating 
eight-year-old James Phipps with Cow Pox.  When the boy later proved to be immune to 
Small Pox humanity was on its way to taming the microbe.  Between 1877 and 1887 
Louis Pasteur advanced the Germ Theory of disease.  Pasteur proved that diseases were 
caused by microbes, identified staphylococcus, streptococcus, pneumococcous, and 
revealed the existence of viral agents.  Earlier foundations had been laid in 1851 at the 
first International Sanitary Conference, which was convened so that world medical 
authorities could confer on quarantine and other international health issues.   
In 1866, the New Jersey Sanitary Commission was formed to advise the Governor 
on public health matters in the wake of devastating cholera outbreaks in the urban 
centers.  The re-growth of European cities during the later middle ages followed by the 
eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution had brought thousands of new people into 
overcrowded urban centers.  Many from rural areas migrated to urban industrial and 
commercial centers and found housing wherever they could, often crowding several 
generations of immediate and extended family into living spaces meant to serve far fewer 
people. These trends continued as huge numbers of the rural and urban populace left 
Europe and Asia for the growing cities of the U.S. in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
                                                 
3  Shelley A. Hearne, Two Years After the Anthrax Attacks, Public Health Preparedness Still Weakest 
Link of Homeland Security, Expert Says (Washington, DC: Trust for America's Health, 2003), 
http://healthyamericans.org/newsroom/releases/release100203.pdf (accessed February 26, 2006). 
4 
Early U.S. public health efforts focused on urban areas to provide safe housing, 
clean drinking water and sanitary disposal of solid and human waste.  Insect and vector 
control became a key tool for defeating typhoid and other epidemics.  Immunization was 
employed to curb what are now called childhood diseases of polio, measles, mumps, 
diphtheria and rubella.  By the 1960s, the public health focus shifted to environmental 
causes of disease and the elimination of pollution.  As environmental issues gradually 
improved, the public health priorities again shifted, this time to individual, lifestyle 
factors that increased risk of developing chronic illnesses.   
Today an ordinary person might view public health as little more than an entity 
that regulates restaurant cleanliness, or investigates neighborhood complaints such as 
high weeds, rodents, or odors. The human face of public health is typically a nurse who 
administers childhood immunizations or senior citizen flu shots.  These activities are at 
the core of public health essential services but are now being overshadowed by more 
sophisticated activities associated with bioterrorism prevention and all hazards planning.  
2. Weapons of Mass Destruction  
In 1991, the Nunn-Lugar Act established the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program (CTR). This act provided U.S. funding and expertise to safeguard and dismantle 
Russian stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.  In 1997, the Defense 
against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act was passed.  In response to threats of terrorists 
using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the act provided additional funding for 
WMD awareness training, enhanced response capability and to carry out a program for 
exercising response capabilities for first responders.4  The 9/11 Commission Report 
endorsed the Nunn-Lugar program by saying “preventing the proliferation of [weapons of 
mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counter-proliferation 
efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative and supporting the Cooperative 
                                                 
4  Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Public Law Public Law 104-201 Sec. 
1401, (1996), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ201.104.pdf (accessed February 26, 2006). 
5 
Threat Reduction Program.”5 The report went on to say that Nunn-Lugar is now in need 
of expansion, improvement and resources. 
When we think of major threats to our national security, one of the first that 
comes to mind is the enormous potential to inflict harm that a biological weapon 
possesses.  A terrorist can unleash nuclear-style destruction without the risk of detection 
of a radioactive source.  To address growing concerns about bioterrorism, emerging 
infectious disease, and the ability of the public health system to respond, Congress passed 
two landmark bills:  1) The Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 (PL-106-
505), and 2) The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (PL-107-288).  
These laws marked the beginning for federal government roles in directing funding 
towards public health preparedness. Approximately $534 million dollars was allocated to 
preparedness, of which $99 million was directed to rebuilding public health capacities.6  
Today, the lack of sustained funding and the federal government’s insistence on relying 
on a “fragmented and inadequate”7 public health infrastructure results in a system of 
public health that remains unprepared.  While the additional funding was helpful in 
beginning bioterrorism planning, the funds were only temporary.  Therefore, they could 
only address changes in tools, hardware, communications, and similar items but not 
address fundamental personnel issues. 
3. Bioterrorism 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the significance of the role 
of public health was an eye opener for the entire nation.  Almost immediately afterwards, 
letters laced with powdered anthrax spores were intentionally sent through the postal 
system and resulted in the loss of life and affected many others.  This bioterrorist attack 
                                                 
5  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/ 
(accessed February 6, 2006). 
6  United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Public 
Health Threats and Emergencies Act : Report (to Accompany S. 2731) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
G.P.O,2000), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS7343 (accessed February 4, 2006). 
7  Elizabeth Fee and Theodore M. Brown, "The Unfulfilled Promise of Public Health: Deja Vu all 
Over again," Health Affairs 21, no. 6 (November/December, 2002): 31, http://proquest.umi.com/ (accessed 
February 3, 2006). 
6 
challenged the New Jersey public health system and its capacity to respond to an act of 
terrorism. Overnight the New Jersey State Department of Health and Senior Services 
(NJDHSS) and the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) laboratories were overwhelmed with 
white powder samples needing identification.  Issues such as chain of custody, 
epidemiological investigation and mass prophylaxis needed to be addressed.  The public 
health community, at every level of government, found itself facing new and difficult 
questions as it attempted to translate complex scientific information into something the 
public could digest and trust.  Public health found itself suddenly allied with players and 
agencies never imagined and became immersed in turf battles and the competition of the 
“who’s in charge” sweepstakes. 
4. Natural Hazards 
The threat of an avian influenza pandemic or natural hazards such as the 2005 
record breaking hurricane season has also placed greater demands on public health and 
questions are being raised about local, state and federal governments’ ability to respond 
and protect the health of the homeland.  Hurricane Katrina illustrated how quickly local 
and state government resources can be overwhelmed. It is not that such events are 
completely unexpected.  Epidemics and storms have happened before and will again but 
with the greater magnitude of these events and the climate of redefinition inspired by 
homeland security concerns they are being viewed in a different light by the public and 
policy makers. The need to reach a higher level of preparedness to respond to 
bioterrorism, the need to promptly identify outbreaks of infectious disease and the need to 
respond to naturally occurring public health threats and emergencies have been driven 
home to the American public with a greater emphasis.   
In November 2005, The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was released 
and outlines how we, as a nation, intend to prepare, detect, and respond to a pandemic.8 
The concern is that an epidemic will become widespread, affecting many different 
countries and populations.  Mitigation issues deal with early detection at home and 
abroad.  The earlier the epidemic is identified the more time is available for preventative 
                                                 
8  U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Washington, D.C.: 
Homeland Security Council,2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/pandemic-influenza.html 
(accessed February 26, 2006). 
7 
action and treatment.  Key to a pandemic response is an adequate supply of medicine.  
The pandemic plan addresses stockpiling existing medications; increasing manufacturing 
capacity; and, removing liability exposure to vaccine manufacturers.  Finally, state and 
local health agencies are required to plan a medical response for strategic national 
stockpile (SNS) deployment utilizing existing medical resources.  The plan is 
comprehensive at first glance but it fails to provide resources (manpower) to accomplish 
the detection, planning or response elements; and, the timeline for acquisition of existing 
medications or development of new vaccines is too far forward to provide any short term 
help.  In other words, the plan is largely window dressing and lip service. 
 
C. A DETERIORATING PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE  
Public health is a fragmented and inadequate infrastructure at all levels of 
government and has been identified as a critical flaw, among several other inadequacies, 
in Homeland Security preparedness.9  The problem stems from the fact that today-there is 
a fundamental mismatch between expectations placed on public health and the system’s 
ability to respond.  The traditional mission of public health “fulfilling society’s interest in 
assuring conditions in which people can be healthy”10  and the vision to “promote 
physical and mental health and prevent disease, injury and disability” has remained the 
same for decades but is now being redirected and redefined by new demands. 
In a 2003 study, “Implications of the World Trade Center Attack for the Public 
Health and the Health Care Infrastructure,” Klitzman and Freudenberg identified several 
shortcomings in the New York City public health infrastructure.  These shortcomings 
were specific to New York City but common to public health both pre- and post- 
September 11, 2001.  They found ambiguity concerning duties and responsibilities in the 
emergency response system that hampered response cohesion particularly between law 
enforcement and public health.  In their lessons learned analysis, they found that planning 
has limits and that no plan can anticipate all possibilities, demonstrating that it is critical 
                                                 
9  9/11 Commission Report. 
10  Institute of Medicine (U.S.), Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, The Future of 
Public Health (Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 1988), 225, 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1091.html (accessed February 4, 2006). 
8 
to maintain a robust public health infrastructure that has reserve capacity beyond routine 
functioning when planning and responding to a natural and unexpected disaster.11 The 
authors concluded that it was imperative to find a balance between resources needed for 
routine public health functions and maintaining a workforce capable of responding to an 
emergency.  It is the coordination and collaboration between local, county and state 
agencies that is critical to the improvement of the public health response. 
“Government public health is considered the backbone of the public health 
system.”12 Why then are we not better prepared? It is not as though federal and state 
governments were unaware that “the public health infrastructure was is disarray.”13 For 
decades additional mandates were being piled on an unraveling public health 
infrastructure.  This issue was the focus of a 1988 report by the Institutes of Medicine 
(IOM) called The Future of Public Health.  In this report, the IOM warned of the 
deteriorating public health workforce14 and in their follow up report, fourteen years later, 
concerns continued as “little improvement was made despite the enormous gains made in 
health status, the United States public health infrastructure did not meet many of the 
objectives listed in the prior report.15  When compared to other nations the United States 
lags in life expectancy, behind twenty-eight other countries including the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan.  U.S. infant mortality is also higher than Cuba, 
Czech Republic, Japan, France and Australia, among others.16  The disparity in health 
status between racial and ethnic groups, men and women, and income levels is a growing  
                                                 
11  S. Klitzman and N. Freudenberg, "Implications of the World Trade Center Attack for the Public 
Health and Health Care Infrastructures," American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 3 (March, 2003): 400-
406 (accessed July 14, 2005). 
12  Institute of Medicine (U.S.), Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 21st Century, 
The Future of the Public's Health in the 21st Century, http://newton.nap.edu/books/030908704X/html/ ed. 
(Washington, D.C: National Academies Press, 2003), 509 (accessed February 4, 2006). 
13  Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, Future of Public Health, 225. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 21st Century, Future of the Public's Health 
in the 21st Century, 509. 
16  United Health Foundation, America's Health: State Health Rankings - 2004 Edition (Minnetonka, 
MN: United Health Foundation, 2004), 
http://www.unitedhealthfoundation.org/mediakit/shrmediakit/State%20Health%202004.pdf (accessed 
February 4, 2006). 
9 
concern.  It was also noted in the 2002 IOM report that an effective public health system 
could assure improvements in each of these areas if the infrastructure was adequate to 
meet prevention objectives.   
Other government agencies also examined these issues.  In 2001, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) prepared a Status Report, Public Health’s 
Infrastructure:  Every Health Department Fully Prepared; Every Community Better 
Protected, revealing to a Congressional appropriations committee that the public health 
community was still structurally weak in nearly every area and there was a need to 
address critical gaps in the workforce capacity and competency.  The report concluded 
that “our immediate investment today will buy something truly priceless for tomorrow – 
enhanced protection for all Americans and improved health for future generations.”17 
However, funding when it does allow workforce improvement only allows staff to work 
within the narrow confines of the grant.  This creates funding stovepipes that do little to 
truly enhance the infrastructure. 
Studies conducted by prominent public health associations; National Association 
of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) and the Association of State and 
Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), are being used as models to identify public health 
infrastructure weaknesses and evaluate the gaps that impact public health preparedness.  
In October 2001, NACCHO received a grant from Robert Wood Johnson and conducted 
a nationwide study. The Local Public Health Agency Infrastructure-A Chart book 
highlighted the important role of public health and current infrastructure deficiencies by 
identifying the workforce duties and compositions of the local health agency (LHA) and 
areas for future improvements.  However, there was no effort to determine the optimal 
workforce staffing level needed to accomplish the government public health mission. 
 
                                                 
17  United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Public Health's Infrastructure a Status Report (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2001), http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/documents/phireport2%5F16.pdf (accessed February 3, 
2006). 
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In 2004, ASTHO published a report entitled State Public Health Employee 
Worker Shortage which stated that an adequate supply of competent public health 
professionals is a vital component of the government public health infrastructure.  
ASTHO believes that the lack of public health workers is a crisis for national public 
health preparedness.18 The report made several recommendations that are intended to 
address the deficiencies.  Among them are raising salaries to make public health officials 
more competitive with the private sector; improving workforce competencies through 
education; formation of regional partnerships; and increasing utilization of improved 
technologies to improve effectiveness of the existing workforce.   
The closest attempt to quantify the extent of the workforce shortage was a 2004 
study titled The Public Health Workforce by Tilson and Gebbie who described the scope 
and content of work done by the (public health) workforce in the field.19  This report 
identified the need to gain hard evidence to formulate a rational public health policy.  
They went beyond the IOM reports that identified manpower shortages and elaborated 
upon Klitzman and Freudenberg’s observation regarding the importance of maintaining a 
system with reserve capacity. Rebuilding the public health infrastructure has been part of 
the national agenda most notably since September 11, 2001.  The outcome thus far, 
however, has not resulted in a substantial improvement in local public health capacity or 
capability as witnessed by the response to events such as Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) and Hurricane Katrina. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The focal point of this study is to assess the public health infrastructure in Union 
County, New Jersey.  This county is worth studying because the infrastructure is weak 
and yet the mandates and expectations continue without serious consideration of the 
current baseline infrastructure. The objective of this research is to utilize and expand on 
                                                 
18  Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, State Public Health Employee Worker 
Shortage Report: A Civil Service Recruitment and Retention Crisis (Washington, DC: ASTHO,2004), 
http://www.astho.org/pubs/Workforce-Survey-Report-2.pdf (accessed July 17, 2004). 
19  Kristine M. Gebbie, The Public Health Work Force : Enumeration 2000 (Washington, D.C: Health 
Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Professions, National Center for Health 
Workforce Information and Analysis, 2000), 318 (accessed February 4, 2006). 
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the NJDHSS formula “Estimating Registered Environmental Health Staffing Needs for 
Local Health Departments”20 when evaluating the public health infrastructure.  This tool 
was developed to “determine how many staff is needed to adequately and professionally 
serve its community”21 but has only been applied to the registered environmental health 
specialist position.  It is the intent of this research to adapt the formula to four core public 
health positions within a local health department.  They include:  1) Epidemiologist 2) 
Health Educator/Risk Communicator 3) Public Health Nurse and the 4) Registered 
Environmental Health Specialist.  Baseline requirements for core positions at a local 
health agency will be determined from the bioterrorism preparedness goals originated 
from the CDC and the public health mandates of the NJDHSS.  By adapting the staffing 
matrix an adequate population based infrastructure can be determined to can meet 
traditional health services, bioterrorism planning and homeland security initiatives and 
expectations. 
This study aims to assist in providing the tools for rebuilding and redeploying the 
public health infrastructure so that it can more effectively address the full range of 
traditional activities as well as the additional bioterrorism (BT) mandates. The key to 
improving the public health infrastructure lies in developing an empirical method to 
objectively determine workforce requirements and then formulating a policy that will fill 
those needs.  This cannot be accomplished without a basis for understanding what needs 
to be done and how many public health people are needed to accomplish it on a daily 
basis. While specific to Union County, New Jersey, the framework used to estimate 
manpower requirements will be applicable to other counties and states in their own 
assessment of local public health infrastructures.  The model can also be used to develop 
a rational funding formula for public health.  
It is essential that stakeholders become made aware of the actual, rather then the 
perceived, day to day functions of public health. In the final analysis it will be public 
awareness that connects the political process to public health preparedness in terms of 
                                                 
20  R. J. DiNunzio, "Estimating Registered Environmental Health Specialist Staff Needs for Local 
Health Departments," http://www.state.nj.us/health/lh/rehscal1.htm (accessed September 18, 2005). 
21  R. J. DiNunzio, "Estimating Registered Environmental Health Specialist Staff Needs for Local 
Health Departments," http://www.state.nj.us/health/lh/rehscal1.htm (accessed September 18, 2005). 
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policy and resource allocation. Enumerating daily functions in terms of quantity and time 
needed provides a means to accurately predict the actual response capabilities of the 
public health system given its current staffing levels.  This case study is designed to 
underscore the facts of the longstanding crisis in public health and sends a message that 
public health is hard pressed to meet the everyday demands they face let alone the 
unexpected.  It is in the best interest of homeland security and state and local health 
agencies that an effective and coordinated countywide public health system be created 
utilizing the valuable assets, talent and experience resident in local health departments.  
“The challenge is to develop inter-connected and complementary systems that are 
reinforcing rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met.”22   To 
accomplish this mission, health departments need to be given tools and resources long 
denied so that they can succeed in the essential work ahead.   
Chapter I introduced the importance of enhancing the public health infrastructure 
especially when being integrated into the homeland security realm.  Chapter II identifies 
the challenges public health confronts when being expected to incorporate homeland 
security and bioterrorism initiatives into the traditional health services protecting the 
health of the community. Chapter II also provides an overall picture of public health and 
the obstacles public health faces when planning for an effective and coordinated 
response.  Chapter III describes state and federal mandates framing the public health 
functions being conducted on a daily basis.  Chapter VI describes the public health 
system in New Jersey and the structure in which mandates are addressed.  Chapter V is a 
case study for Union County, New Jersey in which the work of four core public health 
positions are evaluated along with other bioterrorism positions.  Chapter VI presents 
manpower estimates for the county to reach traditional essential public health services 
and bioterrorism preparedness objectives.  Chapter VII concludes with an argument for 
sustained funding to build public health infrastructure.  
                                                 
22  United States Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, 
DC: Office of Homeland Security, 2002), 72, 4, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20641 (accessed July 
17, 2005).  
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II. CHALLENGES IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH WORKFORCE  
Public health workforce studies reveal infrastructure shortages being created by 
budgetary neglect and an aging workforce nearing retirement. It is local health agencies 
(LHA) who have been hit hard because of an aging workforce, up to 45% of staff 
approaching retirement, vacancy rates as high as 20% and employee turnover rates as 
high as 14%.23 Studies have recognized the need to build the infrastructure capacity of 
public health.  Lacking are studies that provide staffing estimates for a population based 
infrastructure that is able to meet the challenges ahead. Without a clear idea of what 
resources are needed we will not be able to develop a realistic, defensible funding target.  
Investments in the public health infrastructure will serve a dual purpose: improving the 
delivery of health services at the local level and improving the response capability of 
public health as a partner with other first responders.  
The discipline of public health is actually an assortment of many different skill 
sets.  Some require specialized licensure and or training; some provide hands-on health 
care; others entail the scientific and forensic study of disease determinants; while others 
have police powers.  All function independently, yet operate in unison and all are 
assigned overwhelming tasks that require prioritization according to the need of the day.  
It is important to define public health in such a way as to increase the understanding of 
the diversity of the workforce, their and duties and yet recognize the unity of purpose.  
Defining, classifying and integrating the public infrastructure have been the focus of 
increasing attention in meeting the challenges ahead.24  It is critical to address these 
issues as public health plans of meeting the challenges. 
 
A. DEFINING PUBLIC HEALTH 
Public health has meant different things at different times in history and varies 
from state to state, within organizations and among professional associations.  Lack of a 
universally accepted definition ultimately effects how the size, structure, location and 
                                                 
23  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health's Infrastructure. 
24  Gebbie, Public Health Work Force, 318. 
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staffing patterns can vary among a local health agency.  Therefore performance and 
expectations has not been consistent for years. Consistent within the public health 
infrastructure are (1) the professionals who perform public health functions and (2) the 
mission of public health.  “A public health professional is a person educated in public 
health or a related discipline who is employed to improve health through a population 
focus.”25  The mission of public health is defined as fulfilling society’s interest in 
assuring conditions in which people can be healthy.”26   
Bernard Turnock, author of Public Health:  What is it and How it Works, 
elaborated on this description and identified the activities of public health as “organized 
community efforts to prevent, identify, and counter threats to the health of the people”27.  
In his book, Mr. Turnock refers to the 1988 IOM landmark study which became the 
foundation for public health workforce studies.  In the study, public health is based on a 
systems managements approach by providing three core functions:  
1) assessment of population health  
2) policy development  
3) assurance that high-quality public health services are available28   
Within the core functions are ten essential health services explaining how public 
health is involved with protecting the community.  Figure 1 provides a basis of the ten 
essential services as related to the core functions in a system management approach to 
public health.  
 
                                                 
25  Kristine Gebbie, Linda Rosenstock and Lyla M. Hernandez, Who Will Keep the Public Healthy? 
Educating Public Health Professionals for the 21st Century, http://www.nap.edu/books/030908542X/html/ 
ed. (Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, Institute of Medicine Board on Health Promotion and 
Disease Prevention, 2002), (accessed February 4, 2006). 
26  Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, Future of Public Health, 225. 
27  Bernard J. Turnock, Public Health: What it is and how it Works, 3rd ed. (Sudbury, MA: Jones and 
Bartlett, 2004), 420 (accessed February 4, 2006). 
28  Committee for the Study of the Future of Public Health, Future of Public Health, 225. 
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Figure 1.   Ten Essential Health Services (From 
http://www.health.gov/phfunctions/public.htm) 
 
The Essential Services provides a framework and a working definition of public 
health by describing the public health activities that should be undertaken in all 
communities.  
• Assessment 
1) Monitor health status to identify and solve community services 
2) Diagnose and investigate health problems and hazards in the 
community 
• Policy Development 
3) Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues  
4) Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health 
problems  
5) Develop policies and plans that support individual and community 
health efforts 
• Assurance 
6) Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety 
7) Link people to needed personal health services and assure the 
provision of health care when otherwise unavailable  
8) Assure a competent public health and personal health care 
9) Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and 
population-based health services 
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10) Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health 
problems.29 
It is important to note that local health agencies have been urged to embrace the 
essential health services as a means of working with their state health departments, 
communities, and governing bodies to develop a more robust public health capacity, and 
as a means of holding themselves uniformly accountable to the public they serve.30 In 
November 2005, NACCHO attempted to define a LHA in a document known as 
Operational Definition of a Functional Local Health Department.  This report is an 
attempt to provide the framework to secure additional funding and leverage resources 
needed at the local level.31  NACCHO agrees there are inconsistencies within LHAs, and 
yet each LHA is expected to meet the following standards: 
• Understand the specific health issues confronting the community, and how 
physical, behavioral, environmental, social, and economic conditions affect 
them. 
• Investigate health problems and health threats. 
• Prevent, minimize, and contain adverse health effects from communicable 
diseases, disease outbreaks from unsafe food and water, chronic diseases, 
environmental hazards, injuries, and risky health behaviors. 
• Lead planning and response activities for public health emergencies. 
• Collaborate with other local responders and with state and federal agencies to 
intervene in other emergencies with public health significance (e.g.,  natural 
disasters) 
• Implement health promotion programs. 
• Engage the community to address public health issues. 
• Develop partnerships with public and private healthcare providers and 
institutions, community based organizations, and other government agencies  
 
 
                                                 
29  Public Health Functions Steering Committee, "Public Health in America," Office of Disease 
Prevention and Health Promotion, http://www.health.gov/phfunctions/public.htm (accessed February 4, 
2006). 
30  National Association of County and City Health Officials, Operational Definition of a Functional 
Local Health Department (Washington, D.C.: National Association of County and City Health 
Officials,2005), http://www.naccho.org (accessed February 4, 2006). 
31  Ibid. 
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(e.g., housing authority, criminal justice, education) engaged in services that 
affect health to collectively identify, alleviate, and act on the sources of public 
health problems. 
• Coordinate the public health system’s efforts in an intentional, non-
competitive, and non duplicative manner. 
• Address health disparities. 
• Serve as an essential resource for local governing bodies and policymakers on 
up-to-date public health laws and policies. 
• Provide science-based, timely, and culturally competent health information 
and health alerts to the media and to the community. 
• Provide its expertise to others who treat or address issues of public health 
significance. 
• Ensure compliance with public health laws and ordinances, using enforcement 
authority when appropriate. 
• Employ well-trained staff members who have the necessary resources to 
implement best practices and evidence-based programs and interventions. 
• Facilitate research efforts, when approached by researchers that benefit the 
community. 
• Use and contributes to the evidence base of public health.   
• Strategically plan its services and activities, evaluate performance and 
outcomes, and make adjustments as needed to continually improve its 
effectiveness, enhance the community’s health status, and meet the 
community’s expectations. 
It is interesting to see the term bioterrorism omitted from this document especially 
since the traditional role of public health is being upstaged by the threat of bioterrorism.   
Therefore, today’s situation requires a comprehensive approach and, already, a re-
definition.32  
 
B. CLASSIFYING PUBLIC HEALTH 
Prior to their most recent attempt to define LHAs, NACCHO released the Local 
Public Health Agency Infrastructure: a Chartbook, in October 2001.  The purpose of this 
report was to provide a strong concept of the public health infrastructure.  It is a useful 
tool permitting local agencies to compare themselves to national averages and providing 
                                                 
32  Gebbie, Rosenstock and Hernandez, Who Will Keep the Public Healthy? 
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an extensive look at the local public health infrastructure that will help identify areas for 
improvement.33  In New Jersey, public health services are provided almost exclusively at 
the local level, yet 55% of the entire New Jersey public health workforce is employed by 
the NJDHSS.34 When determining whether a LHA is capable of meeting the expectation 
and challenges ahead, it is critical to classify the people who actually perform the 
essential health services. The population in New Jersey is a little more than eight million 
people and those employed at the LHA is 2,244.35 This represents an average of twenty-
eight public health employees per 100,000.   
Other providers such as hospitals, voluntary health organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the business community also provide services.  
Through collaboration and partnership with these agencies, public health is expected to 
not only provide direct services but to ensure that if the services are provided by these 
other agencies, they are incorporated into the strategy of how public health needs are met 
within the community. This is a difficult task because providers are not obligated to 
report the services they provide to any LHA.  The fact remains, public health agencies 
have become the refuge of last resort for people without financial resources or health 
insurance.36  Although acute medical care for the indigent is available through hospital 
emergency rooms and other health clinics, non-emergency, non-acute preventive services 
for the medically indigent remains almost exclusively the responsibility of the LHA. 
Public Health services that are performed by private practitioners or hospitals are 
expected to be reimbursed by insurance and therefore they reach those at or above 200% 
of poverty level.  Government public health agencies remain the only ready sources of 
free health services for the medically indigent.  
                                                 
33  Anjum Hajat, Carol K. Brown and Michael R. Frazer, Local Public Health Agency Infrastructure : 
A Chartbook., 2001 ed. (Washington, D.C.; National Association of County and City Health Officials: 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, 2001), copy; Host: http://www.naccho.org copy 
of survey available at this url. Host: http://www.rwjf.org information about the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation available at this url. (accessed February 4, 2006). 
34  Gebbie, Public Health Work Force, 318. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Elin Gursky, Progress and Peril Bioterrorism Preparedness Dollars and Public Health, 
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/HomelandSecurity/Gursky_Progress_Peril.pdf ed. (New York, NY: 
Century Foundation, 2003) (accessed February 4, 2006). 
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C. INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH INTO HOMELAND SECURITY 
The role of public health at the national, federal, state and local level has become 
an important component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and by 
witnessing recent disasters we can conclude that no single agency is prepared or equipped 
to mount a response independently.  Any response will require cooperation between 
public health and emergency agencies at all levels of government.37  It is, however, the 
public health sector that is the newest agency on the scene and is still working on 
integrating with other first responders such as police, fire, and emergency medical 
services.  Homeland Security has elevated public health personnel to first responder 
status in that they are required to prepare, train, and respond with other first responders.  
This represents an additional workload that has not been captured in traditional public 
health capacity or work force estimates. 
Public health is expected to participate as a full partner without sustained funding 
or adequate staff, further stressing an already over tasked infrastructure.  The NJDHSS, 
for example, only allocates 1.2 percent of their health budget for local public health.38 
Union County receives $538,113 for Bioterrorism planning and $201,424 for Public 
Health Priority Funding used for providing essential health services.  This represents an 
embarrassing $1.41 per Union County resident.  This miniscule amount cannot be 
allocated for emergency exercise, planning or response.  It is not that public health does 
not want to participate in exercises, planning, or response; there is not enough time in the 
day let alone the personnel necessary to conduct a satisfactory job.  The plan to 
incorporate public health preparedness into DHS is raising concerns and may further 
disunite these activities from essential public health functions and undermine the 
integration of bioterrorism preparedness planning into our existing public health 
infrastructure.39 
 
                                                 
37  National Strategy for Homeland Security, 72, 4.  
38  United Health Foundation, America's Health: State Health Rankings (Minnetonka, MN: United 
Health Foundation,2003), http://www.unitedhealthfoundation.org/shr2003/ (accessed February 4, 2006). 
39  Bruce Clements and R. Gregory Evans, "Bioterrorism Preparedness Coordination: An Antaxic Saga 
Continues," Public Health Reports 119, no. 1 (January/February, 2004): 16-18, 
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III. MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF THE PROBLEM 
The Public Health landscape differs at the federal, state and local level.  Like a 
satellite photo, the view from aloft is beautiful, but as you zoom in – detail becomes 
visible and faults are exposed.  A Homeland Security strategy that is developed solely on 
the detail provided by the widest view will fail.  Strategy must be developed based on the 
weakest link in the chain not the strongest.  Failure to take into account local, state and 
federal limitations assures a cascade of problems as responses become more complex. 
 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY   
On October 8, 2001, President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security with 
the purpose of unifying the functions of several federal agencies under a single mission to 
protect our homeland.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security was then developed 
in July 2002 as a foundation to direct local, state and federal agencies in their planning 
efforts for protecting the homeland.  In November 2002, the President signed the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland 
Security.  The strategy demands that homeland security be a “concerted national effort to 
prevent terrorists’ attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”40  The 
Strategy aligns the functions of homeland security into six critical mission areas:  (1) 
intelligence and warning (2) border and transportation security (3) domestic 
counterterrorism (4) protecting critical infrastructure (5) defending against catastrophic 
terrorism and (6) emergency preparedness and response. When the strategy was unveiled 
it made clear that public health sectors are to be specifically involved with:   
• protection of the food, water and public health critical infrastructures 
• surveillance for defending against catastrophic threats  
• quick and effective response with other first responders41  
                                                 
40  National Strategy for Homeland Security, 72, 4.   
41  Ibid. 
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Agencies must be prepared to prevent, protect, respond and recover from a wide 
spectrum of major events. A response will, no doubt, require a unified and coordinated 
national approach.  To address this need, on December 17, 2003, President Bush issued 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8):  National Preparedness. The 
purpose of the directive is to establish policies, procedures and goals that strengthen the 
preparedness of the United States to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies in an all hazards context.  In HSPD 8, all 
hazards preparedness is defined as the “existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, 
and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the 
effectiveness of a multi discipline response effort.”42  Aligned with HSPD 5:  
Management of Domestic Incidents, three national initiatives were introduced 1) the 
National Response Plan (NRP) which defines what needs to be done to manage an 
incident; 2) National Incident Management System (NIMS) which defines how it needs to 
be done and 3) the National Preparedness Goal which defines how well a response needs 
to be done.43    Together, these three initiatives enabled the nation to begin answering 
these questions:  How prepared do we need to be?” “How prepared are we?” and “How 
do we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”44 
The basic premise of the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest 
jurisdictional level possible. Police, fire, public health and medical, emergency 
management, and other personnel are responsible for incident management at the local 
level.  The NRP incorporates best practices and integrates them into a unified 
coordinating structure.  It is built upon NIMS and provides mechanisms for the 
coordination and implementation of a wide variety of incident management and 
emergency assistance activities.  There are fifteen emergency support functions (ESF) 
public health being responsible for ESF 6:  Mass Care, Housing & Human Services and 
                                                 
42  George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8: National Preparedness 
(Washington, D.C: White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2003), 7, 
http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps05-121803-02.pdf (accessed February 4, 2006). 
43  National Response Plan.  
44  Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8: National Preparedness, 7. 
23 
ESF 8:  Public Health and Medical Services.45  Initial safety efforts focus on actions to 
detect, prevent, or reduce the impact to public health and safety. Such actions can include 
environmental analysis, plume modeling, evacuations, emergency sheltering, air 
monitoring, decontamination, emerging infectious disease tracking, emergency 
broadcasts, etc. These efforts may also include public health education; site and public 
health surveillance and testing procedures; and immunizations, prophylaxis, and isolation 
or quarantine for biological threats coordinated by HHS and state and local public health 
officials. The safety and health of responders is also a priority.  Actions essential to limit 
their risks include assets and expertise; risk assessments based upon timely and accurate 
data and situational awareness that considers responder and recovery worker safety.46 
 
B. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
In response to the mission of DHS, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Preparedness (CDC) adopted an all hazards approach to public health preparedness.  All 
hazards refers to the process of optimizing and strengthening preparedness and response 
elements common to all emergencies whether the event is natural or man made.  For 
example:  the elements of disease surveillance used to detect West Nile Virus, measles or 
influenza are identical to those that will be used in an influenza pandemic, a SARS 
outbreak or a biological attack.  Most of the differences that would be seen in a response 
are in the scale of each unique problem event rather than in the technical analysis 
techniques required for each.  
As a result of the anthrax attack, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act 
of 2002 allocated close to $1 billion to improve state and local public health 
capabilities.47  CDC used the money to establish a Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness “Cooperative Agreement” to aid state and local governments in their efforts 
                                                 
45  National Response Plan. 
46  National Response Plan. 
47  Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Public Law 
Public Law 107-188, (2002), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ188.107.pdf. 
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of bioterrorism preparedness and planning.  Each state was required to submit a 
bioterrorism plan to include a focus on six core areas:   
(1) Communications and Information Technology  
(2) Education and Training  
(3) Laboratory capacity for biologic agents  
(4) Preparedness planning and readiness assessment  
(5) Risk communications and health information 
(6) Surveillance planning and readiness assessment 
In 2005, the focus area format was replaced by an all hazards approach stressing 
nine preparedness goals.  The preparedness goals align program activities, tasks, and 
deliverables with Homeland Security’s mission to prevent, protect, respond and recover 
from an event whether manmade or natural disaster.  The goals are designed to measure 
urgent public health system response parameters that are directly linked to health 
protection of the public.48  They are intended to support the NRP and NIMS as well.  
This includes the planning and coordination of public health preparedness against 
bioterrorism, early detection of outbreaks of infectious disease, and response to public 
health threats and emergencies.  In terms of linking the preparedness goals, DHS, CDC 
and NJDHSS were just in time as developing reports about bioterrorism preparedness 
efforts were being evaluated.   
In its third annual report titled Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health from 
Disease, Disasters and Bioterrorism, a panel of twenty experts participated in the study 
for the purpose of grading federal and state bioterrorism preparedness efforts.  Overall 
federal public health and bioterrorism performance received a grade of D+ and nearly 
85% of states received a score of six or less of ten possible indicators.49  Interesting, New 
Jersey received a five in 2004 and a seven in 2005 due to enhancing its laboratory 
                                                 
48  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Continuation Guidance for Cooperative Agreement 
on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism," Department of Health and Human 
Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/continuationguidance (accessed March 5, 2006). 
49  Trust for America's Health, Ready Or Not?:  Protecting the Public's Health from Diseases, 
Disasters, and Bioterrorism (Washington, DC: Trust for America's Health, 2005), 79, 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror05/bioterror05Report.pdf (accessed February 4, 2006). 
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capabilities.  Five years after September 11 the expert panel concluded that the federal 
government’s greatest failing was a complete absence of a defined set of cooperative 
agreement accountability indicators.50   This is an important statement because it sets the 
stage for CDC to align the goals with DHS strategy to prevent, detect, recover and 
improve preparedness. 
The CDC Preparedness Goals51 are as follows:   
 
Prevent:  (1) Increase the use and development of interventions known to 
prevent human illness from chemical, biological, radiological 
agents, and naturally occurring health threats.  
(2) Decrease the time needed to classify health events as 




 (3) Decrease the time needed to detect and report chemical, 
biological, radiological agents in tissue, food or environmental 
samples that cause threats to the public’s health.  
(4) Improve the timeliness and accuracy of information regarding 
threats to the public’s health as reported by clinicians and 
through electronic early event detection, in real time, to those 
who need to know. 
 
Investigate:  (5) Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, and 
appropriate interventions for those affected by threats to the 
public’s health. 
 
Control:  (6) Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and 
health guidance to those affected by threats to the public’s health. 
 
Recover:  (7) Decrease the time needed to restore health services and 
environmental safety to pre-event levels.  
(8) Increase the long-term follow-up provided to those affected 
by threats to the public’s health. 
 
                                                 
50  Trust for America's Health, Ready Or Not?:  Protecting the Public's Health from Diseases, 
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Improve:  (9) Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations 
from after-action reports following threats to the public’s health. 
 
C. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES 
(NJDHSS) 
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) that sets 
policy and standards for statewide public health programs; regulates and licenses health 
care facilities, practitioners and public health professionals; maintains a bio level three 
laboratory; administers various grants for public health programs and collects and 
analyzes communicable disease data.  In 1997, New Jersey made a commitment to the 
citizens and the public health community to enhance the public health infrastructure at 
the local level for bioterrorism preparedness.  Approximately $16,107,770 was awarded 
to NJDHSS and immediately allocated to build a public health infrastructure by 
strategically positioning twenty-two Local Information Network Communication System 
(LINCS) public health agencies throughout the state. This was the beginning of the 
process of bioterrorism preparedness and enhancing the public health infrastructure.   
Planning countywide response to public health emergencies including 
bioterrorism continued and on January 16, 2001, the New Jersey Commissioner of Health 
sent a letter to all local health officers urging them to continue their efforts in planning 
and preparedness.  In her letter, Commissioner Grant stated “with the emergence of new 
pathogens and possible terrorist attack this effort will help identify, strengthen and 
integrate the role of public health in responding to other wide-scale emergencies.”52  Five 
years later, bioterrorism planning has advanced but the role of public health is 
questionable in an integrated response.  Despite good intentions, the plans have not 
worked.  Instead, the new response structures, created by the NJDHSS, further duplicated 
and complicated an already convoluted public health communication system. Instead of 
partnering with the existing emergency management response structure, the NJDHSS is 
supplanting the emergency response system by requiring public health communications 
and response to flow to and from a newly established health command center (HCC) 
instead of the traditional New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJ OEM) 
                                                 
52 Christine Grant to New Jersey Health Officers, January 16, 2001.    
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communication where representatives of all agencies have been assigned to the 
emergency operation center (EOC).  The HCC creates a parallel public health silo 
alongside NJOEM.  Further complicating this issue is another NJDHSS creation, the 
regional Medical Coordinating Center (MCC).  The initial intent of the MCC is to 
provide a clear picture of hospital surge capacity and public health responses.  It is 
unclear, however what the role of the MCCs will be but as the planning efforts continue, 
it appears these centers will be developing additional policies on public health/hospital 
response procedures.  The fear is that new channels now force responders to repeat 
messages three times to assure that information reaches the appropriate receptor.  What 
remains to be seen is how the system will respond to the contradictory commands. 
The 2005 NJDHSS budget reported two significant objectives that support the 
DHS and CDC missions of protecting the nation.  They are:(1) prepare New Jersey to 
rapidly detect, identify, and respond to health–related aspects of biological, chemical, 
radiological, nuclear, explosive, and incendiary acts of terrorism as well as natural 
disasters and disease outbreaks and (2) strengthen New Jersey’s public health 
infrastructure by adopting and implementing best practice standards, creating a 
comprehensive communications system that links health care providers and institutions 
statewide, and form a coordinated disease surveillance and response network.53  
In New Jersey there are two significant public health mandates that provide LHAs 
operational direction when enforcing or reporting progress in public health within their 
jurisdictions.  These mandates are known as:  1) Local Core Capacity for Bioterrorism 
Preparedness or Attachment C and 2) Public Health Practice Standards for Local Boards 
of Health or Practice Standards.   Attachment C is the New Jersey version of the CDC 
Preparedness Goal Grant with very few changes except to add several more activities for 
LHAs to fulfill in the grant requirements.  The seven LINCS staff is tasked with ensuring 
that the preparedness goals are met in accordance with the expectations of the NJDHSS.  
                                                 
53  New Jersey Department of Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, "Health and Senior 
Services: Department of Health and Senior Services Overview" in State of New Jersey Budget FY 2005-
2006 (Trenton, NJ: State of New Jersey, Department of the Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, 
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Practice Standards, on the other hand, are enforced by114 local health agencies 
throughout the state.  It is understood that the staff of each agency can be used in a “dual 
use” role.  However, this approach has recently created tension among public health 
agencies because certain positions require specific certification, skills and training. 
Ongoing tensions exist as to whether LINCS should be responsible for ensuring practice 
standards as well as bioterrorism planning without funding and with the same core 
positions.    
1. Local Core Capacity Infrastructure for Bioterrorism Preparedness 
The primary purpose of Attachment C is “to enhance and integrate local public 
health agencies’ state of preparedness to acts of terrorism and other public health 
emergencies.”54  There are two critical priorities of this grant:  1) minimize, to the fullest 
extent possible, the human health consequences associated with the emergence of a novel 
strain of influenza virus (Flu Pandemic Planning) and 2) greatly expand capacity to 
expeditiously and efficiently distribute/administer antibiotics and/or vaccine to the entire 
population at community-based points of distribution (PODS) or other methods.55  
The preparedness goals provide focus in reaching the priority objectives while 
following the all hazards approach and not compromising preparedness efforts for other 
types of emergencies.  Coordination and collaboration between local, county and state 
agencies is critical to New Jersey’s application of the national preparedness standards by 
using the CDC Preparedness Goals in order to measure public health response and 
performance.  There are nine goals with many Required Critical Tasks (RCT) LINCS 
agencies are expected to perform.  Each goal, outcome, method to accomplish the goal 
and required critical task (RCT) are described in Table 1 below.  In summary, the tasks 
below are a monumental task for LINCS agencies because they are also being asked to 
assist the local public health agencies in their efforts of providing essential health 
services. 
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Increase the use and 
development of interventions 
known to prevent human 
illnesses from chemical, 
biological, radiological agents, 
and naturally occurring health 
threats … 
1A Prevent All-Hazards Planning 10 
2 Prevent 
Decrease the time needed to 
classify health events as 
terrorism or naturally occurring 
in partnership with other 
agencies … 
2A Prevent 
Information Collection and 
Threat Recognition 5 
2B Prevent 
Hazard and Vulnerability 
Analysis 3 
3 Detect/Report 
Decrease the time needed to 
detect and report chemical, 
biological, radiological agents 
in tissue, food, or 
environmental samples that 
cause threats to the public’s 
health … 
3A Detect/Report Lab Testing … 
4 Detect/Report 
Improve the timeliness and 
accuracy of information 
regarding threats to the public’s 
health … 
4A Detect/Report 
Health Intelligence Integration 
and Analysis 4 
5 Investigate 
Decrease the time to identify 
causes, risk factors, and 
appropriate interventions for 
those affected by threats to the 
public’s health  … 
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Public Health Epidemiological 
Investigation 5 
   
6 Control 
Decrease the time needed to 
provide countermeasures and 
health guidance to those 
affected by threats to the 




6B Control Emergency Public Information 4 
6C Control Worker Health Safety 9 
6D Control Isolation and Quarantine 5 
6E Control 
Mass Prophylaxis and 
Vaccination 6 
6F Control 
Medical and Public Health 
Surge 4 
7 Recover 
Decrease the time needed to 
restore health services and 
environmental safety to pre-
event levels  … 
7A Recover 
Economic and Community 
Recovery 4 
8 Recover 
Increase the long term follow 
up provided to those affected by 
threats to the public’s health  2 
9 Improve 
Decrease the time needed to 
implement recommendations 
from the after actions reports 
following threats to the public’s 
health.  3 
9A Improve 
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Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) plan to receive and 
distribute medication within 48 
hours 4 
Note:  …:  Indicates not applicable 
Table 1. Preparedness Goals for the State of New Jersey 
 
2. Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of 
Health  
Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health 
(LBOH), or Practice Standards, promulgated by the NJDHSS, Division of Local Health 
and Emergency Services were adopted by the state Public Health Council as the model 
system to provide local public health activities.  Practice Standards, referred to as 
N.J.A.C. Chapter 8:52 were adopted December 30, 2002 and made effective February 18, 
2003.  The law sunsets on February 18, 2008 unless readopted.  On May 1, 2003, the 
Commissioner of Health, Dr. Clifton Lacy, circulated a letter to every municipal mayor 
and governing body, each Health Officer and more than 500 LBOH to announce the 
adoption and implementation process for practice standards.  In the letter, Dr. Lacy says 
“the rules will serve as a blueprint in the building of a strong governmental public health 
infrastructure indicated by the 1988 and 2003 IOM reports to more effectively protect 
and promote the public’s health and well-being.”56  The standards are intended to “assure 
the provision of a modern and manageable array of public health services to all citizens 
of New Jersey.”57   
                                                 
56 Dr. Clifton R. Lacy to New Jersey Health Professionals, May 1, 2003. 
57  Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health in New Jersey, 
Public Law Chapter 52 (2003): 8:52-1, http://www.state.nj.us/health/lh/chapter_52.pdf (accessed July 17, 
2005). 
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“The standards mandate cooperation among community partners, public and 
private care givers in recognition of the lack of infrastructure in the public health 
system.”58 This places responsibility for interagency cooperation squarely on the LHA, 
which has no authority to carry out this mission or ability to influence outside agencies.  
Partnerships within the community are well accepted by the local health officer but 
partners operating in a profit environment have no incentive to invest in programs 
sponsored by the LHA and those that operate in a non-profit environment have limited 
resources to commit. 
The core component of the practice standards includes performance monitoring 
and evaluation of local programming and services.  LHAs are expected to conduct 
community surveys, health risk assessments, conduct resource inventories and form 
public health partnerships with outside agencies and disciplines.  Despite these 
expectations, there is limited support and targeted funding to make cooperation happen.  
NJDHSS provides guidance in the form of increasingly detailed reporting processes. 
Most state employees, who have programmatic oversight over the LHAs’ components, 
lack local health experience.  The result is a set of guidelines that are excessively 
restrictive and burdensome and are oblivious to the resource limitations of the system 
they govern.   
The concept of articulating program guidelines for local public health activities is 
a NJDHSS tradition.  Practice Standards do not deviate from the State custom of 
stipulating increasingly detailed program requirements.  Practice Standards enumerates 
an array of what are euphemistically called “minimum” public health programs and 
capacities in a detailed series of 16 chapters.  Each of the core staff positions has 
corresponding responsibilities enumerated in Practice Standards; these mandates are 
imposed on every LHA regardless of population base or staffing levels.  
Prior to the adoption of Practice Standards the NJDHSS promulgated program 
guidelines called “Minimum Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health.”  
                                                 
58  Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health in New Jersey, 
Public Law Chapter 52 (2003): 8:52-1, http://www.state.nj.us/health/lh/chapter_52.pdf (accessed July 17, 
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Minimum standards contained a series of quantifiable program performance objectives.  
These performance objectives were adopted into the Appendix to the Practice Standards 
and entitled “Guidelines for Best Practices.” Incorporated into the Practice Standards (see 
Appendix in “Guidelines for Best Practices”) was the original 1980s era “Adult Health 
Services Guidelines.” Copies of this document are no longer in circulation but can be 
obtained from NJDHSS.  It is important to note that since all the old guidance 
requirements are incorporated in the new standards (in addition to new program 
mandates) the requirements continue to expand with each new iteration of program 
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IV. PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE IN NEW JERSEY 
The population of New Jersey is over eight million people. It is the most densely 
populated state in the Union (1,030 people per square mile) thirteen times the national 
average.59 New Jersey has an extensive system of highways and railroads as well as one 
of the largest seaports in the US.  It is highly industrialized with ninety of the nation’s 
100 largest companies.  New Jersey has the most malls in one twenty-five square-mile 
area and has the most diners in the world.60  These facts illustrate the challenges public 
health are faced with when protecting the health and safety of the community.      
There are twenty-one counties, 566 municipalities and a public health system 
consisting over 500 Boards of Health (BOH), one hundred and fourteen (114) 
independent LHAs, and the twenty-two LINCS agencies. Many public health officials 
express frustrations about their inability to address their dual role in both the traditional 
public health duties and the secondary bioterrorism planning capacity. 
 
A. LOCAL HEALTH AGENCY (LHA) 
In New Jersey, a local health agency (LHA) is defined as a county, regional, 
municipal or other governmental agency organized for the purpose of providing health 
services, administered by a full-time health officer and conducting a public health 
program pursuant to law.61  LHAs are established by state statute and local ordinance and 
operate under a “Home Rule” format.  Home rule grants municipalities partial autonomy 
of self government under which they manage their own affairs, in accordance with the 
Constitution.  Under home rule, there is a tendency to duplicate services and workforces 
within relatively small geographic areas in a given region, i.e. each municipality has a 
school system, library, police department, fire department, public works department, etc., 
each with their own administrative and supervisory structure, capital requirements, 
pension obligations, and health insurance premiums.  Despite this inherent duplication of 
                                                 
59  "New Jersey: Fast Facts and Trivia," http://www.50states.com/facts/newjersey.htm 
60  Ibid. 
61  Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health in New Jersey, 8:52-
1-8:52-28. 
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services, the public health community has not benefited from a glut of resources.  One 
problem with home rule is that local health agencies serve population bases that are too 
small to financially support the level of service required by federal and state mandates.  
To solve this problem, many agencies currently resort to contracted labor, part-time 
positions or employees being utilized in a dual role capacity.  The result is a pool of 
public health personnel being shared by multiple agencies or across disciplines. This 
works passably when there is no undue stress on the system but is easily and quickly 
overwhelmed with even small scale events.  In an emergency, part time employees will 
be expected to discharge full time duties in more than one municipality, simultaneously 
 
B. LOCAL INFORMATION NETWORK COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
(LINCS) 
New Jersey lacks a consistent definition for LINCS agencies.  According to NJ 
Practice Standards, LINCS is “a network of public health agencies which are 
interconnected with the Department through an electronic public health information 
system that is built on personal computer and internet technologies”62  In October 2005, 
New Jersey Legislature passed the Emergency Model Health Powers Act in times of 
declared public health emergencies.  The Act defines LINCS as “the lead local public 
health agency in each county or identified city responsible for providing central planning, 
coordination and delivery of specialized services in partnership with the other local health 
agencies in order to prepare for and respond to acts of bioterrorism and other forms of 
terrorism or other public health emergencies or threats.”63   
Since the inception of LINCS, roles and responsibilities for coordination with 
LHAs were always vague. LINCS started as a simple email system. It has evolved into 
“the lead public health agency” in every county throughout the state.  This evolution 
occurred without considering the existing legal structure and authority of LINCS 
employees within their counties.  The NJDHSS is misleading the CDC as they insist they 
are reaching out to “local” public health departments when in fact, they are only reaching 
                                                 
62  Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health in New Jersey, 8:52-
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63  Emergency Health Powers Act, Public Law Public Law 205, Chapter 222, (2005), 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2004/Bills/PL05/222_.PDF (accessed February 26, 2006). 
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out to the 22 LINCS and bypassing the remaining 114 local health agencies.  It is LINCS 
Health Officer’s who are required to be present on BT planning and Practice Standards 
discussions while reaching out to a select few of the 114 LHAs.  Today, the goal and 
vision of LINCS is to facilitate a regional response by enhancing the public health 
infrastructure.64 LINCS is asked to fill in the gaps of providing essential health services.  
On paper, the state enhanced the public health infrastructure by funding the core 
positions, but this was negated by the increased workload from the CDC mandates that 
were imposed at the same time while now being asked to meet the requirements of 
practice standards. 
A recent example of the workload dilemma was witnessed in April 2005 when 
New Jersey hosted the congressionally-mandated international terrorism exercise known 
as TOPOFF3 (T3).  T3 was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the State of New Jersey 
by exercising the plans, policies, procedures, systems and facilities of federal, state, and 
county/local response organizations against a biological attack.  The scenario was a 
bioterrorist attack using pneumonic plague as the agent.  This was New Jersey’s first 
public health exercise and lessons learned have indicated the need for public health to be 
integrated into the traditional emergency management system.  Officially, the public 
health agencies met the expectations of the week long exercise.  However, in reality, the 
manpower needs were filled by mobilizing “notional” resources, interpreted as using 
imaginary public health workers to meet the expectations of the exercise.  No serious 
effort was made to determine where these public health workers would come from to 
fulfill these manpower needs.  LINCS was responsible for opening points of dispensing 
(PODS) to provide mass prophylaxis for the entire county. One epidemiologist was 
expected to conduct case contact disease investigations for more than 19,000 victims and 
participate in all public health/law enforcement responses.  It was an overwhelming task 
that neither the NJDHSS, the LHAs, nor LINCS was equipped to accomplish.  We are in 
the same predicament now as we prepare for an influenza pandemic response.  When we 
are no longer doing practice exercises, it will become necessary to find thousands of real 
people to staff these “notional” positions used during the exercises.  There are no 
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guidelines or plans for finding these people or training them to do the required tasks.  In 
point of fact, NJ does not have enough manpower to meet its needs as demonstrated by 
the exercise, but officials ignore this lesson as they engage new plans based on old 
assumptions. 
 
C. RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL 
The Practice Standards specify certain core staff positions needed to accomplish 
the public health objectives.  The minimum staff positions for a local health agency are: 
• Health Officer - a licensed professional responsible for overall administration 
the public health program and compliance with all mandated activities 
• Public Health Nurse - is a licensed professional position that conducts the 
personal health programs of the LHA 
• Health Educator - Certified Health Educator Specialist (CHES) who conducts 
health education programs designed to encourage lifestyle modifications that 
will eliminate or reduce risk factors of chronic diseases  
• Registered Environmental Health Specialist - (REHS) is a licensed 
professional position who conducts the environmental program including 
investigations and enforcement of applicable laws and statutes  
• Epidemiologist - (EPI) is specially trained to investigate reportable disease 
cases and conduct infectious disease surveillance 
• Information Technology - Specialist (IT) to maintain computer operating 
systems including information transfer and web-based programs to assure 
interoperability with local, state and federal systems 
• Public Health Planner - a state employee assigned to the LHA to ensure 
consistency among county work plans and programs.  
The responsibilities of the Health Officer, as chief administrator of the LHA, are 
very broad and are incorporated into more than half of the Practice Standard subchapters.  
The Health Officer is responsible for defining the programs and capacities that are 
necessary to deliver population based services.  Program areas incorporate the three core 
functions of public health and the 10 essential public health services.  They include: 
providing access to expertise in the areas of planning, health education, epidemiology, IT 
management, training and staff development, prevention and control of communicable 
diseases and emergency preparedness planning, assuring 24/7 emergency response 
capability in accordance with state, county and federal requirements.   
39 
The administrative functions include planning and management roles, which 
incorporate the Assessment Protocol for Excellence in Public Health (APEX) as the 
management tool required by NJDHSS.  Additional mandates include: assurance of 
workforce competency, fiscal responsibility, and continuous quality assurance, 
completion of the NJDHSS annual reports including the Local Health Evaluation Report 
(LHER), the Board of Health registration and completion of the Community Health 
Improvement Plan (CHIP).   
Each LHA is required to participate in community health partnerships and assure 
that public health needs within their jurisdiction are properly addressed.  Together with 
the Partnership Coordinator, the Health Officer is responsible for the development of a 
regional coalition of health providers.  This coalition will provide the “efficient, 
unrestricted, systematic delivery of recognized, qualified public health services.”65 For 
the purpose of this research the partnership coordinator position is not evaluated simply 
because it is not a recognized public health position and in Union County the partnership 
coordinator role is filled by a committee of health officer’s and LINCS staff called the 
governmental public health partnership.   
The Health Officer monitors the health of the community by collecting and 
recording vital statistics and analyzing health status measures.  The Health Officer must 
also participate in a county wide Community Health Assessment conducted according to 
the Mobilizing for Action through Planning and Partnerships (MAPP) methodology.  
Policy Development is also a Health Officer responsibility requiring development and 
tracking of measurable health objectives, policies to govern prevention and treatment 
services and recommend the adoption of model public health laws.  The Health Officer is 
responsible for identifying the community’s health needs and incorporating an 
improvement plan into the CHIP.  This evaluation must address a systematic review of 
the effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of population-based health services.  The 
Health Officer is responsible for assuring workforce competency by assessing existing 
staff competency, identifying gaps in expertise and ensuring proper manpower resources 
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exist to deliver mandated services needed to achieve public health program objectives.   
Finally, the Health Officer must diagnose and investigate health problems and hazards 
and assure that there is a mechanism in place to provide disease surveillance and 
epidemiology services with access to a qualified public health laboratory. 
The Public Health Nurse is a required to develop written policies that incorporate 
the 10 core public health functions into a comprehensive nursing program.  He/She must 
facilitate community outreach and health assessment.  The Nurse is must integrate 
epidemiology into the case identification/treatment continuum.  He/She will direct health 
guidance and counseling, as well as primary clinical prevention and early intervention 
strategies (screenings, preventive care, immunization etc).  Public Health Nursing is the 
delivery system for personal health services.  The individual program features are 
specified in detail in the Best Practices appendix and are reported in the LHER.  Program 
requirements include: 
• Communicable Disease Activities 
a. Reportable Diseases – surveillance and investigation of communicable 
diseases and identification and early detection of outbreaks. 
b. Immunization – promote vaccination against vaccine preventable 
diseases in infants, school age children and adults. 
c. Tuberculosis control – provide TB control services to include 
diagnosis and treatment, routine testing, case contact follow-up and 
preventative therapy. 
d. Sexually Transmitted Diseases – diagnosis, treatment, reporting and 
investigation of STDs, counseling and preventative education. 
e. HIV – administer a planned program to prevent & control HIV 
infection to include counseling and referral to treatment and social 
service agencies. 
• Maternal and Child Health activities 
a. Infants and preschool – health supervision for infants and pre-school 
children to include preventative health care, developmental 
monitoring, outreach to health care providers with emphasis on 
medically indigent. 
b. Childhood Lead poisoning – prevention and control of lead poisoning 
in children to include, education, screening, diagnosis, environmental 
management and treatment. 
c. Improved Pregnancy Outcome – public health nursing services to 
provide pre-natal care, information and counseling, referral and 
outreach to high risk women including adolescents. 
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• Adult Health Services 
a. Cancer services 
1. Cervical – 3% of women 15 – 34 and 3% of women 35 – 64 at 
high risk, and education yearly for 5% of women 15 and older 
in, risk factors for cervical and breast cancer, importance of 
PAP, and importance of breast screening including 
mammography 
2. Colorectal – screening 3% of people over 40 for risk factors 
b. Diabetes risk assessment 
c. Cardiovascular disease – hypertension screening of 1% of high risk 
population, risk factor assessment for people with high blood pressure 
 
The Health Education/Risk Communicator (HERC) is responsible for designing a 
comprehensive health education and health promotion program “designed to facilitate 
behavioral and environmental adaptations to protect and improve health.”66 This program 
must be “culturally and linguistically appropriate and fully integrated into the daily LHA 
program.”67  The HERC must assure that the ten essential health services are represented 
in the health education programs and that each has an evaluative component.  It is 
necessary to include referral to assistance and social service resources.  The HERC is 
responsible for inventory of every health education program in their jurisdiction. 
The health education program is a structured education program including 
components for alcohol abuse, drug abuse, smoking prevention and cessation, nutrition, 
physical fitness and exercise that are targeted at specific risk factors and populations at 
risk.  It is critical that these programs be evaluated for effectiveness.  Components 
contained in the Best Practices appendix are: cardiovascular education for the general 
public, health education and promotion services for older adults with yearly health needs 
assessment, alcohol abuse and medication management, provide gerontology education 
for staff, colo-rectal cancer education to risk factors and prevention to 3% of people over 
40, diabetes services education, smoking prevention programs, physical fitness, and drug 
awareness programs. 
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The Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) core position mandates 
that LHAs design systems to protect against and prevent environmental conditions that 
contribute to adverse health outcomes.  Key to this objective is the assessment of 
environmental health risks and implementation of proactive preventative programs and 
systems.  The REHS serves in the traditional public health inspector role and is 
responsible for the enforcement of public health laws.  It is crucial to integrate 
enforcement of state and local ordinances with modern law enforcement procedures for 
evidence collection and case documentation.  The mandated components of the 
environmental health program are: 
• Recreational bathing – regular bacteriological testing, safety and sanitation 
inspection twice annually, accident investigation 
• Campgrounds – annual inspection for compliance with state code 
• Food surveillance – annual inspection of retail food establishments, food 
borne illness investigation compliance with state sanitary code 
• Occupational Health – maintain records on local employers, investigate 
occupational diseases, train one staff member in Industrial Hygiene 
• Public health nuisances – investigate and abate public health nuisances 
involving insect and rodent control, solid waste, housing and noxious weeds 
• Rabies and Zoonoses diseases-communicable from animals to man. 
• Control rabies vaccination and animal bite investigation and animal control 
The Epidemiologist core position is charged with both the analytic and descriptive 
components of disease surveillance and outbreak investigation.  The Epidemiologist 
monitors population health status, identifies and investigates health problems and studies 
the distribution, and determinants of factors that influence the health of the population.  
In a LHA, the Epidemiologist is critical to disease surveillance and outbreak recognition.  
Once a disease is identified, the epidemiologist will investigate the source of the disease; 
identify vulnerable populations and direct remedial actions. 
The Medical Director assures preventive and personal health services are 
available to the public.  This health care must be “culturally and linguistically 
appropriate” with both materials and staff to provide epidemiological follow-up, adult 
and childhood immunizations, with special provisions for in medically underserved or 
vulnerable populations. 
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The Information Technology staff is required to maintain information technology 
systems that are compatible with and connected to the NJDHSS system and are secure 
and Health Insurance Privacy and Portability Act (HIPPA) compliant.  
Each public health core position has referenced chapters in Practice Standards as 
well as detailed, quantifiable program guidelines stated in the Best Practices Appendix.  
The Best Practices objectives are measured in a NJDHSS report called the Local Health 
Evaluation Report or (LHER).  Each LHA is required to provide a quantitative 
assessment of its activities each year in the LHER.  The purpose of the LHER is to serve 
as a guide to Practice Standards implementation and as an assessment tool for the local 
health agency's performance in the implementation of the Practice Standards.68  The 
LHER contains detailed information on the number of actions conducted under each of 
the “Guidelines for Best Practices” categories.  The LHER has a section enumerating the 
number of critical positions maintained by the LHA; a section documenting staff 
development pursuant to Practice Standards workforce competency requirements; a 
section listing source and amount of funding; a section on expenditures by program 
category; and, a subjective questionnaire measuring progress toward assessment, 
assurance and policy development goals.  However, the LHER lacks a mechanism to 
measure progress against public health program objectives.  This omission limits the 
Local Health Evaluation Report (LHER) utility and misses an opportunity to truly 
evaluate the LHA program effectiveness and public health infrastructure gaps.  
                                                 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
45 
V. CASE STUDY-UNION COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 
There are twenty-one municipalities in Union County employing ten health 
officers, four serve multiple jurisdictions and six serve their single local jurisdiction.  
There is one County Health Officer responsible for ensuring an adequate and appropriate 
level of countywide participation and collaboration in public health preparedness and 
response to bioterrorism, outbreaks of infectious disease and other public health threats 
and emergencies.  The population in Union County is 522,541 in 100 square miles with 
only forty-seven public health employees within the ten local health departments.  This 
represents a ratio of nine public health workers per 100,000 populations.  “Nationally, 
the ratio of public health workers to the population has dropped from 219 per 100,000 in 
1980 to 158 per 100,000 in 2,000.”69  Based on this statistic, Union County is well below 
the national average in the public health workforce.  Their primary function is preventing 
disease.  Unfortunately, the leading causes of death in the county as well in the New 
Jersey are heart disease, followed by cancer, stroke, chronic respiratory disease and 
diabetes.  Death rates for all but stroke are lower than the state rates.  The death rates 
from chronic illnesses are typical for the region but these adverse outcomes represent the 
failure of public health to address lifestyle issues and health screens that are mandated by 
state and federal agencies.  Table 2 details the demographics in Union County, NJ. Tables 
3 through 6 identify the four core public health positions performance workload.   The 
performance provides a comparison of mandated public health program targets and LHD 
performance as self-reported by local health officers in their 2004 LHER reports. The 
tables are organized by the primary job function of the activity. 
 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS  
Union County is home to the Elizabeth Port (the second largest seaport in the 
country), major railroads and highways to include the New Jersey Transit Railroad 
System, The New Jersey Turnpike, Garden State Parkway and the Newark International 
Airport.   Surrounding the county is the East Coast’s largest Petroleum Port, the largest 
                                                 
69  Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.  
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Auto Port and neighbors the City of Newark which is the largest city in New Jersey.  The 
significance of this is to illustrate the rich critical infrastructure and opportunities for 
potential exposure to natural or man made biological threats.  There are several languages 
other than English that are native to Union County residents.  These include Spanish, 
Polish, Russian, Creole, Italian and Portuguese, among others, creating difficulties 
meeting the mandated language and cultural appropriate programming.  It is assumed that 
there is a significant undocumented foreign population living within the community.  
Table 2 provides base year 2000 Census information in Union County. 70   
 
Table 2  Demographics1 Union County, New Jersey 
Union County Total Population 2000 Census (N): 522,541   
  N 
N < 200% of 
Poverty2 
Sex    
 Male 251,372 30,165 
 Female 271,169 32,540 
Reportable LHER3 Categories by Age and Gender   
 Children < 5 years of age 18,702 2,244 
 Children < 2 years of age 14,576 1,749 
 Teenagers 15 - 19 years of age 31,451 3,774 
 Females 15 - 64 years of age 173,727 20,847 
 Females < 20 years of age 35,776 4,293 
 Females > 40 years of age 145,235 17,428 
 Males > 40 years of age 146,893 17,627 
 Adults 22 - 61 years of age 285,766 34,292 
 Adults > 40 years of age 146,893 17,627 
 Adults > 50 years of age 212,651 25,518 
 Adults > 65 years of age 117,976 14,157 
 
                                                 
70  United States Census Bureau. Census 2000 Demographic Profile Highlights, 2000), 
http://factfinder.census.gov (accessed March 5, 2006). 
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Notes:  
1 Numbers derived from the Union County, New Jersey 2000 Census. 
2 < 200% of defined as households earning < $31,340 annually as per the Department of 
Health and Human Services Guidelines. Reporting poverty distribution demonstrates 
focus of public health resources by neediest population. 
3 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report.  Data were derived from the 2004 LHER 
Reports. 
Table 2. Demographics Union County, New Jersey 
 
Almost 14% of the population is over age sixty five, which is about 1% above the 
state percentage.  Approximately 8.4%of the population lives below 200% of the poverty 
guideline ($31,340).  The synopsis of Union County Demographics is contained in Table 
2.  This information is needed to target segments of the population for specific public 
health services.  The information will then be assessed as it relates to existing public 
health performance and is critical in estimating manpower needs in the following tables. 
 
B. PERFORMANCE AND TARGET ACTIVITIES FOR CORE PUBLIC 
HEALTH PERSONNEL 
Age and sex breakouts were taken directly from the 2004 census data.  The use of 
the 200% of guideline was employed to limit the target population to a reasonable figure.  
It is also expected that families above the 200% of poverty guideline will be more likely 
to have health insurance or have regular access to health care and therefore less likely to 
need or utilize public health clinics.  Although the 200% poverty guideline was also 
employed in the Older Adult Health Services target estimates, there is no way of knowing 
whether the delivered services were provided to that population segment or not.  Seniors 
of all income categories typically utilize these services.  The same holds for Cervical 
Cancer screening; these services are well established and accepted by women of all 
income categories.  
Because of the inconsistency of data formats common to public health and the 
census age data and income break points, it was necessary to interpolate information such 
as demographics of those living at 200% of poverty guidelines, populations at risk and 
some targeting.  Only the most recently published documents were used so as to be 
consistent with the time frame of the 2000 Census and the 2004 LHER.  When 
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determining target populations, a conservative approach was used to calculate the lowest 
probable number rather than the highest.  This may underestimate actual level of need 
however this serves to bias against the hypothesis proposed in this research. 
In 1989 the NJDHSS published a document titled The Adult Health Services 
Guidelines.  This document was adopted by reference when the Minimum Standards of 
Performance for Local Boards of Health was adopted in 1991.  This same document is 
referenced in the current Public Health Practice Standards for Local Boards of Health in 
New Jersey.  Although the document is old, the targeting objectives as well as the 
targeting methodology are still valid.  The 1989 guidelines remain the only attempt by the 
NJDHSS to quantify performance objectives.  Therefore all targeting figures were 
calculated by applying the Adult Health Services methods found on pages 36 through 38 
to the 2000 census data.71  Tables 3-6 show Performance of Core Public Health Positions 
by Target Activities.   
1. Epidemiologist  
Represented in Table 3 is the core position of Epidemiologist.  The comparison 
shows investigations compared to disease reports.  Since there is only one epidemiologist 
employed and assigned to Union County LINCS, all investigations were conducted by 
staff other than the epidemiologist.  All five local hospitals and each local health agency 
conduct limited investigations utilizing nursing and REHS staff. 
 
Table 3 
Performance for Epidemiology 
  




 Reportable Disease Investigation  
  Cases (N): 2,106 
  Follow up (N): 966 
Communicable Diseases 
 Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD)  
  Cases (N): 539 
                                                 
71  New Jersey. Department of Health, Adult Health Services: Guidelines (Trenton, NJ: New Jersey 
State Department of Health, Division of Epidemiology and Disease Control,[1989]). 
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  Follow up (N): 85 
 
Tuberculosis 
(TB)   
  Cases (N): 64 
  Follow up (N): 141 
Notes: 
1 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report 
2 Expected numbers of disease cases is not calculated for a given year 
Table 3. Performance for Epidemiology 
 
2. Health Educator/Risk Communicator (HERC)  
In Table (4) promotion programming is targeted at specific populations in need of 
nutrition information or at risk of alcohol, drug and tobacco abuse.  Looking at the HERC 
performance table it is obvious that adult health education objectives are far from being 
met.  Clearly this will impact chronic illness incidence. 
 
Table 4 
Performance and Target Activities for Health Education/Risk Communication (HERC) 
Health Education Category 










Alcohol: Target 56.5% of adult population 
between 22-61 years of age    
 
Number of Participants (5% 
of target population) 646 8,073 8 
 Number of sessions  40 538 7 
 
Smoking: Target 20% of adult population 
between 22-61 years of age    
 
Number of Participants (5% 
of target population) 726 2,858 25 
 Number of sessions 36 191 19 
 
Physical Fitness: Target 22% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age    
 
Number of Participants (5% 
of target population) 864 3,143 27 
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 Number of sessions 34 210 16 
 
Drug Abuse: Target 36% of Teen population 
between 15-18 years of age       
 
Number of Participants (5% 
of target population) 788 566 139 a 
 Number of sessions 37 38 98 a 
Total Participants 3,024 14,640 21 
Total Sessions  147 977 15 
Notes:  
1 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report 
a Specific drug and alcohol educational programs in one municipality contributed to the 
high rate of participants and sessions in 2004.  
Table 4. Performance and Target Activities for Health Education/Risk Communication 
(HERC) 
3. Public Health Nurse  
Table (5) lists the best practice activities that are measured by clients served and 
the estimated target population that was in need of the service.  The NJDHSS uses cancer 
education targets of 5% of the women aged fifteen to sixty four for Breast and Cervical 
cancer and 3% of both sexes over forty for Colo-Rectal cancer.  Diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease targets are age and risk factor based by NJDHSS.  There is a wide 
disparity in nursing performance among the various public health nursing program 
activities.  The general failure to meet objectives will again impact early detection of 
deadly chronic illnesses. 
 
Table 5 
Performance and Target Activities for Public Health Nursing 













Maternal and Child Health      
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Table 5 
Performance and Target Activities for Public Health Nursing 













 Infants and Preschool Children     
  Children Served  2,420 18,702 13 
  N < 200% of Poverty2 1,117 2,244 50 
 Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention    
  
Children screened:  85% 
>2 years and at <200% 
Poverty 351 1,487 24 
 Improved Pregnancy Outcome (IPO)    
  
Females < 20 years of 
age receiving prenatal 
and post partum visits at 
< 200 % Poverty  39 482 8 a 
 Childhood Immunizations    
  N < 200% of Poverty 1,117 2,224 50 
Cancer Screening and Education     
 
Cervical Cancer:  3% females age 15-64 
years of age 378 625 60 
 
Prostate Cancer:  5% males > 40 
years of age     
  N < 200% of Poverty 379 881 43 
 
Mammography:  50 % females > 
40 years of age     
  N < 200% of Poverty    … 8,714 … 
 Education (N):  1,856 10,221 18 
 
 
Adult Health and Diabetes     
 Diabetes Screening Services     
  
1% of adults > 
50 years of age  1,092 2,127 51 
 
 
Education (N)  381 2,127 18 
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Table 5 
Performance and Target Activities for Public Health Nursing 













    
Continued…    
    
    
Adult Health and Cardiovascular Disease    
 
Cardiovascular Disease Screening 
Services     
  
1% of adults > 
50 years of age  3,579 2,127 168 b 
  
Adults  initial 
screenings  180 638 28 
 Education (N):  321 2,764 12 
Older Adult Services: > 65 years of age     
 Flu Vaccine    11,920 14,157 84 
 
Pneumonia Vaccine: 20% of 
Older Adults  69 2,831 2 c 
 
Health Screenings: 1% of Older 
Adults  478 1,180 41 
School Health     








Enforcement   5 … … 
 
 








1 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report; 2 Poverty is equal to $31,340 
… : Indicates not applicable 
a Improved Pregnancy Outcome (IPO): This is low at 8% because typically low income 
teenage mothers do not seek care until at least their third trimester 
b Cardiovascular Screening in adults over 100% because senior citizens attend clinics on 
a regular basis and get counted multiple times. 
c Pneumonia vaccine in adults was very low because it is poorly accepted by seniors and 
an up front cost is involved  
Table 5. Performance and Target Activities for Public Health Nursing 
 
4. Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) 
Table (6) shows the Registered Environmental Health Specialist section; targets 
are extrapolated based on the reported performance contained in the LHER and LHA self 
reports.  Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention is based on published NJDHSS program 
goals of screening 85% of children under two years old. REHS performance is generally 
better than the other core positions.  This may be attributable to the fact that the 
environmental staff position is probably the most visible position involved in complaint 
resolution and recognized at the local level for its value in code enforcement in upholding 




Performance and Target Activities Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) 
    







Bathing Places     
 Inspections 75 83 90 
 
Enforcement 
Actions 20 22 91 
 
Youth Camps     
 Inspections 48 60 80 
Food Establishment 
Surveillance    
 Inspections 2,459 3,026 81 
 Re-Inspections 556 696 80 
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 Complaints 453 545 83 
 
Enforcement 
Actions 123 151 81 
Public Health 
Nuisances     
 Inspections 5,086 5,984 85 
 Complaints 4,731 5,566 85 
 
Enforcement 
Actions 398 468 85 
Childhood Lead Poisoning 
Prevention    
 
Environmental 
Investigations 288 466 62 
 
Confirmed 
Positive 39 92 42 
 
Residences 
Abated 40 92 43 
Rabies and Zoonosis Control 2    
 
Animal Bite 
Investigation3 1,280 … … 
 
Pets Shops 
Inspected 9 9 100 
Notes: 
1 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report 
2 Zoonosis:  Diseases transmitted from animals to humans    
3 Number of animal bite investigations are not estimated for a given year 
…: Indicates not applicable 
Table 6. Performance and Target Activities Registered Environmental Health Specialist 
(REHS) 
 
C. GAP ANALYSIS OF CORE PUBLIC HEALTH FUNCTIONS  
When the delivered services are compared to the targeted services, the reader 
becomes aware of the gap between the desired performance level and the actual 
performance level.  It is evident that the existing public health infrastructure in Union 
County is inadequate to reach the minimum service levels identified by NJDHSS.  The 
gap is most evident in the health education and public health nursing.  There is an 
intuitive link between the chronic illness death rate and the lack of health education 
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programming.  Early detection of chronic illnesses is a key to minimizing the adverse 
health impacts.  This is a function of public health nursing and chronic illness screening.  
Another key to chronic illness prevention is lifestyle interventions that eliminate risk 
factors that influence chronic illness development.  This is a function of health education.  
If an adequate investment had been made in health education in 1989 when the Adult 
Health Guidelines were published, would we have been able to reduce the current death 
rate?  There is no way to answer that question with any certainty. However, public health 
practitioners would be hard pressed to answer in the negative.  The gaps in program 
performance we see in the tables can be directly attributed to manpower deficiencies and 
clearly show that not only do we lack the reserve capacity mentioned by Klitzman and 
Freudenberg, but we are not staffed at minimum levels.  When fire fighters are not 
fighting fires they are engaged in training, fire prevention inspections and education 
programs.  These activities allow them to reduce the incidence of fires and therefore 
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VI. MANPOWER ESTIMATES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
COMPLIANCE 
A. MANPOWER METHODOLOGY TOOL 
The State Health Department web site contains a formula that enables health 
officers and Board of Health members to estimate the Registered Environmental Health 
Specialist manpower needs.72  Utilizing the formula in Appendix 1, we arrive at an 
annual work year of 983 hours for REHS and 1313 hours for the remaining core 
positions.  These two numbers differ because travel is a significant portion of the REHS 
workday, where the others have limited expected travel time.  Further, dividing the 
manpower year by the number of hours needed to meet target performance levels, we can 
determine the optimal manpower level for each position.  Tables (7) through (11) 
estimate manpower needs the by Core Public Health Positions to comply with the NJ 
Public Health practice Standards. 
 
B. MANPOWER ESTIMATES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE STANDARDS 
Table (7) shows the result of manpower estimates for the epidemiologist position. 
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, there are no local epidemiologists.  All of the 
epidemiological investigations were conducted by staff other than epidemiologists.  This 
results in less than optimal disease surveillance and detracts from some other job 
function.  This is the clearest example of the public health infrastructure dilemma, a true 
case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. 
 
Table 7  
Epidemiology Deficit for Practice Standards Compliance 
   
Hours per 
Disease 
Report 1 LHER2 
Hours per 
Activity 
Target Activity     
 Reportable Disease Investigation    
  Cases 0.33  2,106 695 
                                                 
72  DiNunzio, Estimating Registered Environmental Health Specialist Staff Needs for Local Health 
Departments, 3-3. 
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  Follow-Up  2 966 1,932 
Communicable 
Diseases     
 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases 
(STD)    
  Cases 1 539 539 
  Follow-Up  1 539 539 
 Tuberculosis (TB)    
  Cases 0.33 64 21 
  Follow-up  1 141 141 
 
Annual Required 




per Epidemiologist     … … 1,313 
 
Epidemiologists 
Required to Complete 
Workload Hours (N)       … … 




Epidemiologists (N)      … … 0 
 
Manpower Deficit 
Epidemiologists (N)         … … 3 
Notes: 
1 0.33 hours (or 20 minutes) is based on local health experience 
2 LHER:  Local Health Evaluation Report 
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in Appendix 1 
…:  Indicates not applicable 
Table 7. Epidemiology Deficit for Practice Standards Compliance 
Table (8) shows the result of manpower estimates for the health education 
position.  Time estimates are based on the 2004 LEHR reported activity divided by 
available manpower hours. Using the LEHR reported number of clients served, divided 
by the number of health education sessions conducted, yields a result of fifteen clients per 
session.  The number of sessions conducted divided by the available health education 
man-hours yields a time frame of 6.3 hours per session.  Based on experience, this is a 
reasonable figure to use for planning purposes when class prep time, class time, outreach, 
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follow-up and reporting are considered as components making up one session.  Health 
education population targets are based on Adult Health Services Guidelines, divided by 
fifteen clients per session, multiplied by 6.3 hours per session.  This result, divided by 
1313 work hours per year, yields the estimated number of Health Educators needed to 
reach objectives.  
Table 8   
Health Education/Risk Communications (HERC) Deficit for Practice Standards 
Compliance 
Health Education 




Hours per Health 
Education 
Category3 
Alcohol 6.3 538 3,389 
Smoking 6.3 191 1,203 
Physical Fitness 6.3 210 1,323 
Drug Abuse 6.3 38 239 
 
Annual Required 




per HERC    … … 1,313 
 
HERCs Required to 
Complete Workload 
Hours (N)    … … 5 
Available HERCs (N)     … … 2 
Manpower Deficit 




1 6.3 hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting programs 
2 Target numbers based divide hours/category by hours/unit 
3 Hours calculated by multiplying hours/unit by target sessions 
…:  Indicates not applicable 
Table 8. Health Education/Risk Communications (HERC) Deficit for Practice Standards 
Compliance 
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Table (9) shows the manpower estimates for the Public Health Nurse.  Each of the 
required activities is assigned an hourly rate that is derived from LHA experience.  These 
time estimates are multiplied by the target population number and then divided by 1313 
hours to arrive at the full time equivalent manpower estimate. 
 
Table 9 
Public Health Nurse Deficit for Practice Standards Compliance 
Activity Hours per Unit 1 
Target Number of 
Clients (N) Hours per Activity 
Maternal and Child 
Health Clinics 0.75 2,244 1,683 
Lead Screening 0.40 1,487 595 
Improved Pregnancy 
Outcome (IPO) 2.25 482 1,085 
Childhood 
Immunizations 0.40 2,244 898 
Cervical/Breast Cancer 
Screening 0.45 625 281 
Prostate Cancer 
Screening 0.54 881 476 
Mammography 1.10 8,714 9,585 




Vaccinations 0.75 16,989 12,742 
Health Screenings 0.40 1,180 472 
Cardiovascular Disease 
Screenings 0.30 2,127 638 
Public School Audits 2.50 230 575 
Private and Preschool 2.50 191 478 
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Table 9 
Public Health Nurse Deficit for Practice Standards Compliance 
Activity Hours per Unit 1 
Target Number of 
Clients (N) Hours per Activity 
Cancer Education 0.40 10,221 4,088 
Diabetes Education 0.40 2,127 851 
 
Cardiovascular Disease 
Education 0.40 2,764 1,106 
Annual Required 




per Public Health 
Nurse 3      … …    1,313 
 
Public Health Nurses 
Required to Complete 
Workload Hours (N) … … 28 
Available Public 
Health Nurses (N) … … 21 
 
Manpower Deficit 
Public Health Nurses 
(N)     … … 7 
Notes:   
1 Hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting programs 
2As reported in Local Health Evaluation Report LHER report 
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in Appendix 1 
…:  Indicates not applicable 
Table 9. Public Health Nurse Deficit for Practice Standards Compliance 
Table (10) shows the manpower estimates for the Registered Environmental 
Health Specialist (REHS) position.  Manpower estimates are obtained by following the 




a general rule of thumb that one Registered Environmental Health Specialist is required 
for a population of 15,000”73  Using this ratio would result in a more serious staff 
deficiency.   
 
Table 10   
Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) Deficit for Practice 
Standards Compliance 










Bathing Place     
 Inspection 2 83 166 
 Re-inspection 1 22 22 
Youth Camp     
 Inspection 2 60 120 
 Re-inspection 1 15 15 
Food 
Establishment 
Surveillance     
 Inspection 2.5 3,026 7,565 
 Re-inspection 2 696 1,392 
 Complaint 2 545 1,090 
 Plan review 1 151 151 
Public Health 
Nuisance     
 Complaint 1 5,566 5,566 
 Investigation 1 5,984 5,984 
Childhood 
Lead 
Poisoning     
 Risk assessments 2 466 932 
 Residences abated 8 40 320 
Rabies and 
Zoonosis 
Control 2     
 Animal bite investigations 1 1,280 1,280 
 Pet shop inspection 2 9 18 
Other     
 Schools and Institutions 2.5 230 575 
 Court/Enforcement action 3 541 1,623 
Annual Required Workload Hours … …       
                                                 
73  DiNunzio, Estimating Registered Environmental Health Specialist Staff Needs for Local Health 
Departments, 3-3. 
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Table 10   
Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) Deficit for Practice 
Standards Compliance 












Annual Hours Available3 
per REHS … … 1,313 
 
REHSs Required to Complete Workload 
Hours (N)     … … 27 
 
Available 
REHSs (N)       … … 17 
 
Manpower Deficit REHSs (N)    … … 10 
Note:  
1 Hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting programs 
1 Zoonosis:  Diseases transmitted from animals to humans 
2 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in Appendix 1 
…:  Indicates not applicable 
Table 10. Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) Deficit for Practice 
Standards Compliance 
 
Table (11) provides a summary of the manpower estimates for the four core 
positions and reveals the need for three epidemiologists, three Health Educators, seven 
public health nurses and ten REHSs to comply with New Jersey Practice Standards.  
Review of the performance comparisons actually shows nursing performance has large 
gaps between targets and outcomes. The reason for this lies partially in the fact that today 
nurses fill health education and epidemiology roles in addition to the pure nursing duties. 
It is important to remember that these estimates would significantly increase the public 
health workforce in the county and yet they would still be well below the national 
average of 158 per one hundred thousand residents.  The current manpower estimate is 
limited by restricting targeting to residents living at 200% of poverty or less.  If the 



















Communication 6,155 5 2 3 
 
Public Health 





Specialist 26,819 27 17 10 
TOTAL 73,243 63 40 23 
Notes:   
1 Manpower needed is determined by Dividing Workload Hours by Available Hours.  See 
Appendix 1. 
Table 11. Summary of Core Public Health Position Deficit for Practice Standards 
Compliance 
 
C. MANPOWER ESTIMATES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH 
BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS 
NJDHSS program staff in each specific program area set the standards for 
reporting.  They are uniformly detailed in the amount of data that the grantee is required 
to provide on a quarterly basis.  Grant requirements for each of the seven, core staff 
members stipulate regular monthly meetings with various local stakeholders and require 
submission of agendas, attendance records and minutes on a quarterly basis.  The 
resulting reports routinely exceed thirty pages and require (at least) one week for staff to 
complete.  This does not include the incessant follow-up telephone contacts between staff 
and NJDHSS seeking clarification, additional documentation or modifying the reporting 
system to be consistent with the guidelines of CDC preparedness goals.  A conservative 
estimate of the “reporting-only” manpower drain is one full time equivalent.  Almost 
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20% of the county’s preparedness effort is devoted to satisfying NJDHSS over-sight.  
This follows the findings of Elin Gursky in her study Drafted to Fight Terror, U.S. Public 
Health on the Front Lines of Biological Defense in which she concludes “many have 
noted that Bioterrorism planning and funding initiatives, rather than expanding resources, 
augmenting scalability, and amalgamating personnel had, in itself, become a unique and 
narrowly focused stovepipe.”74  
The Local Core Capacity Infrastructure for Bioterrorism Preparedness grant was 
reviewed by each core position and critical task.  An estimate of time to complete each 
function per position was determined for each task.  Total hours per position were 
divided by available hours (1313) to determine the full time equivalent.  Since most tasks 
require local health agency cooperation, a local time estimate was included.  Table 12 
represents the time estimate, evaluated by each core position, needed to complete each of 
Preparedness Goals and over seventy-eight required critical tasks in the Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Grant.  When an analysis is conducted to determine manpower 
requirements to be in compliance with the preparedness goals, we find that the grant 
funded positions of Epidemiology, LINCS Coordinator and the HERC are not adequate 
to support the workload.  Not only is there a shortfall in the funded positions but there is 
a significant need in the area of LHA involvement. Successful completion of each of the 
grant’s critical tasks requires a significant local commitment and substantial cooperation 
that detracts from some other required activity Compliance with the grant requirements 
will require an additional influx of three FTEs at the local level (LINCS or LHAs).  Even 
this fails to take into consideration the need to bring program plans back to the 
municipality and coordinate them with local Emergency Operating Plans and agencies.  It 
is unrealistic that this coordination would consume less time than the county product.  
Multiply that by twenty-one municipalities and a significant shortfall is revealed.  
                                                 
74  Elin A. Gursky, Drafted to Fight Terror U.S. Public Health on the Front Lines of Biological 
Defense [U.S. Public Health on the front line of biological defense] (Arlington, Va.: ANSER, 2003), 

















Planner HO3 IT4 
1. A.  All Hazards 
Planning 884 109 109 109 109 109 124 0 
 
2. A.  Information 
Collection/ Threat 
Recognition 40 364 7 388 364 21 21 0 
 
2. B.  Hazard 
Vulnerability Analysis 20 0 7 7 30 45 45 0 
 
4. A.  Health 
Intelligence Integration/ 
Analysis 385 962 234 7 982 21 104 0 
 
5. A.  Public Health 
Epidemiological 




Communications 0 24 24 1,113 133 21 7 1,384
6. B.  Emergency Public 
Information 30 64 36 47 162 12 36 0 
6. C.  Worker Health 
Safety 120 72 21 7 72 72 48 0 
6. D.  Isolation and 
Quarantine 2,120 52 52 52 60 52 88 0 
6. E.  Mass 
Prophylaxis/Vaccination 70 205 205 205 331 205 205 0 
6. F.  Medical & Pub 
Health Surge 0 46 102 18 18 36 25 0 

















Planner HO3 IT4 
Table 12 













Planner HO3 IT4 
7. A.  Economic & 
Community Recovery 0 0 0 21 84 63 84 0 
8.  Recover 0 32 4 14 32 14 14 0 
 
Total Hours (Annual) 3,949 2,083 947 2,016 2,530 678 954 1,384
Manpower Needed 
(N)a        3 2 1 2 2   1 1      1 
 
Current Staff (N)              0                   1                 1                       1                    1                 1            1           1 
 
Total  Deficit                     3                    1                 0                       1                    1                 0            0           0 
             
Notes:   
1 Local Information Network Communication System 
2 Health Education/Risk Communications 
3 Health Officer 
4 Information Technology 
a Number’s are rounded to nearest whole number 
Table 12. Estimating Manpower Deficit for Compliance with Bioterrorism Preparedness 
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D. SUMMARY OF MANPOWER DEFICIT IN UNION COUNTY, NEW 
JERSEY 
If Union County were the average United States County there would be 827 
workers in the public health workforce rather than the forty-seven currently employed.  
According to the manpower estimates there is a manpower deficit of twenty-three 
positions needed to accomplish the objectives of Practice Standards. These results 
support the fact that public health is expected to do more with less.  If you treat adverse 
health outcomes as public health failures review of the chronic illness morbidity and 
mortality in the county you can see that the public health infrastructure in Union County 
is insufficient to accomplish its mission. 
The need to conduct this type of analysis in every county should be obvious.  The 
workforce shortage becomes more critical when viewed from the perspective of 
emergency response to a biological attack or an influenza pandemic.  Klitzman and 
Freudenberg observed that in an emergency, the public health infrastructure lacks the 
capacity to mount an effective response.  They suggested that a standing workforce with 
not only the capacity to provide recognized health services but a reserve capacity was 
needed to effectively meet the challenges of a large scale emergency.  The response to a 
biological attack or an influenza pandemic will entail deployment of either the Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS), or a locally amassed medical stockpile.  As observed in 
TopOff3 this will require a massive, labor intensive effort, brought together almost 
without warning.  There are two variables and one constant in a large-scale public health 
response.  The constant is the population base that will need medical prophylaxis.  The 
first variable is the length of time of the disease incubation period; the longer the 
incubation period the more time there is to mobilize a response.  The second variable is 
the size of the workforce available to implement the response; a large workforce can 
distribute prophylaxis to a given population faster than a small workforce.  Using a 
pharmaceutical distribution-staffing model developed by the Weil/Cornell Medical 
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School, the Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak Response Model (BERM),75 we can 
predict staffing needs, based on certain conditions, for Points of Distribution (POD) to 
provide prophylaxis for Union County.  Using a smallpox scenario with an incubation 
period of thirteen days, we assume that it takes three days to diagnose the primary 
outbreak, leaving ten days to immunize 522,541 residents to mitigate the secondary 
outbreak.  In the NJ Heath Services Grant, grantees are to strive to ensure that “smallpox 
vaccine can be administered to all known or suspect contact of cases within three days; and if 
necessary to their entire jurisdiction with in ten days.”76  Entering the Union County 
workforce of forty-seven people into the program we find that we will need 197 days to 
immunize the entire population.  Giving the current workforce only 25,167 people could 
be immunized in the ten-day target window, leaving 497,374 people without protection.  
If we are to meet the ten day target we must determine how many people we will need.  
Based on the model and using an optimistic clinic flow rate of 120 residents per hour, 
BERM tells us that we need a staff 1,232 people to accomplish the task.  The Public 
Health Workforce Enumeration 2000 credits New Jersey with a total local public health 
workforce of 2,244 people.  Union County would need 55% of the total local public 
health workforce in the state to meet the target timetable.  There are twenty other counties 
that would be facing similar manpower shortfalls.   
Table (13) is a summary of the total manpower deficit for public health 
professionals in Union County, NJ.  To be in compliance with NJ practice standards and 
conform to the bioterrorism preparedness goals, twenty-nine additional staff members 
must be added to the public health workforce.  Union County is currently staffed at 68% 
of the needed workforce level.   
                                                 
75  Nathaniel Hupert and Jason Cuomo, "The Weill/Cornell Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak 
Response Model (BERM)," Weill Medical College of Cornell University, 
http://www.aha.org/aha/key_issues/disaster_readiness/resources/vaccination.html (accessed February 6, 
2006). 




Manpower Deficit for Compliance with Practice Standards and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness 














Epidemiology 3,867 2,083 5 1 4 
Health Education/Risk 
Communication 6,155 2,530 7 3 4 




Specialist 26,819 … 27 17 10 
Deficit         68          43  25  
Other Core Positions in Bioterrorism Grant 
Health Officer … 954 1 1 0 
Public Health Planner … 678 1 1 0 
LINCS Coordinator … 2,016 2 1 1 
LHA2 Support … 3,949 3 0 3 
Information Tech … 1,384 1 1 0 
Deficit           8 4 4 
Total Personnel Deficit              76 47 29 
Note: 
1 BT: Bioterrorism 
2 LHA:  Local Health Agency 
Table 13. Manpower Deficit for Compliance with Practice Standards and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness, Union County, New Jersey 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This research has described public health in light of new realities that include but 
are not limited to homeland security concerns.  The purpose of this research has been to 
refine perceptions of public health roles and responsibilities during a response by: 
• Identifying specific public health mandates at the local, state and federal level 
that require additional manpower investments 
• Developing  performance metrics that can be used to measure progress toward 
objectives and quantify performance deficits across the board 
• Developing  manpower need projections and goals 
• Developing a means to forecast budget needs. 
The Strategy for Homeland Security stresses the need for a robust public health 
component to respond to and recover from a range of emergencies from the biological 
dangers posed by an influenza pandemic to the use of toxic agents in a terrorist attack.  
This Strategy relies on the same infrastructure that has proven incapable of meeting US 
Department of Health and Human Services National Health objectives.  The Homeland 
Defense strategy relies on an infrastructure that has been studied and found lacking in 
both workforce capacity and capability.  If it is to be truly effective the national strategy 
must be based upon the actual, rather than the expected, capabilities of the weakest unit 
in the region of highest risk or vulnerability. 
State and federal planners are focused on evaluating public health programs 
strictly from the preparedness viewpoint rather than focusing energy and funding on 
building up the primary function of public health.  All hazards preparedness begins by 
strengthening the response elements that are common to a spectrum of emergency 
situations.  Training and equipping an inadequate workforce does little to improve 
preparedness.  The public health infrastructure is in need of massive infusions of money 
and manpower.  The public health infrastructure is the core of Bioterrorism mitigation.  
In Public Health mitigation is manpower. 
The Public Health infrastructure in New Jersey and nationally has been neglected 
for decades.  Attempts were made by NJ to enhance the infrastructure by creating the 
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LINCS agency but sustaining these agencies will be questionable at the start of the 
August 2006 grant cycle.  Mandates and objectives have been heaped upon this 
infrastructure ignoring the lack of capacity that prevents their realization.  The tasks 
associated with traditional Public Health have a central role to play in accomplishing the 
Homeland Security mission.  Public Health prevention concepts and personnel are 
essential to control infection spread, reducing vulnerabilities, minimizing damages and 
aiding recovery from a biological emergency.  It is not enough, however, to simply assert 
this in Homeland Security planning documents.  Logical as it may be, the public health 
resources need to be aligned with the new planning goals.  This effort has already begun 
but better tools and measures are needed in order to redeploy resources, avoid duplication 
and generate new targeted funding.   
In the 2004 edition of America’s Health: State Health Rankings; A Call to Action 
for People and Their Communities, New Jersey ranked a dismal forty-first out of fifty in 
per capita spending on public health.77  As if this ranking wasn’t bad enough, between 
2003 and 2004, New Jersey witnessed an 11% decrease in the public health budget.78 In 
2004, NJ fell to forty-eighth decreasing spending from $32 to $14 per person.79  The 
NJDHSS accounts for less than one million dollars in public health funding to Union 
County while the municipalities account for more than ten million dollars in local public 
health budgets.80 A total of $758,113 for traditional public health and bioterrorism 
preparedness is distributed to Union County from the SDHSS.  This represents 
approximately $1.45 per person from the SDHSS versus approximately $19.00 per 
person local contribution.  One can conclude public health will have a more difficult time 
meeting New Jersey mandated bioterrorism efforts and traditional health services at the 
local level as the state 2006 budget is posted with an expected decrease of 13.2%.81  A 
10% decrease in the public health workforce has already made an impact on the 
                                                 
77  United Health Foundation, America's Health: State Health Rankings - 2004 Edition. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Local Health Evaluation Report (LHER). 
81  Health and Senior Services: Department of Health and Senior Services Overview, D-133-D-164. 
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functional capacity of LHAs.  As shown in Table 13, Union County needs twenty-nine 
people for compliance with practice standards and bioterrorism preparedness.  To close 
the manpower gap in Union County an additional, sustained $3 million per year needs to 
be added to the public health pot to fund and equip an additional twenty-nine full-time 
employees.   
The need for reinvesting in public health is as obvious as the threat of influenza 
pandemic or bioterrorism is real. Victims of an influenza pandemic or bioterrorist attacks 
will be local, the response will be local and therefore there must be a commitment to 
local mitigation.  It is ironic that public health is frequently referenced to in homeland 
security preparedness and terrorism prevention while at the same time it is being 
massively under funded as a Homeland Security partner.  It is in the best interest of 
homeland security and state and local health agencies that an effective and coordinated 
countywide public health system be created that will utilize the valuable assets, talent and 
experience resident in local health departments.  “The challenge is to develop inter-
connected and complementary systems that are reinforcing rather than duplicative and 
that ensure essential requirements are met.”82  To accomplish this mission, health 
departments need to be given the tools and resources.   
The role of public health in responding to natural and man-made disasters is an 
important Homeland Security issue.  If public health is to become the “indispensable 
pillar of our national security framework”83 that has been called for, then it will require 
not only political support but increased funding and additional manpower.  If 
governments are serious about including public health in the homeland security mission 
of preventing, protecting, responding, and recovering from major events or threats, then 
the shortages I have identified must rectified in every jurisdiction across the country. 
This study has shown that the Union County New Jersey’s Public Health 
infrastructure is inadequate from a manpower standpoint to either fulfill state or federal 
health objectives or bio preparedness functions.  National studies indicate that Union 
                                                 
82  National Strategy for Homeland Security, 72, 4. 
83  Sam Nunn, "The Future of Public Health Preparedness," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 30, no. 
3 (Fall 2002): 202-210, http://proquest.umi.com (accessed July 17, 2005). 
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County is not unique in this position.  As Congress scrutinizes each dollar of Homeland 
Security funding that is spent, the Centers for Disease Control is formulating a system of 
metrics to gauge public health preparedness at the local level.  These metrics will be used 
to evaluate progress toward preparedness goals and to direct future funding toward 
recipients that are most likely to meet objectives.  If these metrics fail to incorporate a 
manpower capacity element they will inadvertently favor those jurisdictions that are most 
capable of mounting a response and further penalize those jurisdictions that need the 
most support.  Funding is needed to reinforce the weakest links not the strongest.  This 
study demonstrates that better metrics can be employed to assess the infrastructure 
capacity and predict a baseline, staffing model that will facilitate a true “dual use,” “all 
hazards” public health-domestic preparedness structure.   
It is imperative that the capacity of the public health infrastructure is increased as 
a Homeland Security priority.  If infrastructure capacity is not the first step in public 
health preparedness, each succeeding step will be addressed as a compromise of daily 
priorities competing against long term goals.  In the world of “just in time” supply chains, 
the idea of a reserve capacity has become synonymous with inefficiency, however in 
public health it has to be viewed as an asset, money in the bank as it were, not a liability.  
Investments in infrastructure capacity must be targeted according to population based 
health objectives if we are to maximize the dual domestic preparedness public health 
uses.  Federal spending priorities must be re-aligned for public health to become a partner 
in the mission of Homeland Security.  This study argues that that the goal of sustainable 
funding for public health begins with an accurate measure of the capacities of the system 
in relation to demands placed upon it. Without such a measure public health will continue 
to fail in its primary functions and lack the capacity to meet Homeland Security goals.  
This study will provide the foundation for further research into the capabilities of the 
public health infrastructure.  As quantitative workforce measures are refined, we as a 
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Formula for Estimating Core Public Health Personnel 
Step Number 
Actions Taken to 
Estimate 
Personnel Need Estimate Calculation 
Step 1. 
Determine total 
Manhours per year 
[Multiply work 
week by 52] Work Week   
  
Work Hours 






  35 52 1,820  
         
Step 2. 
Determine total 
man-hours per year 











  Vacation 7 12 84 
  
 
Holidays 7 13 91 
  
 
Sick 7 7 49 
  
 
Personal 7 2 14 
  
 




off due to 
absences     287 
Continued…      
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Appendix 1 
Formula for Estimating Core Public Health Personnel 
Step 
Number 
Actions Taken to 
Estimate Personnel 
Need Estimate Calculation 
Step 3. 
Determine actual man-
hours per year [Step 1 - 
Step 2] 
Total Available 




off due to 




(Hours) 1,533   
Step 4 
Determine travel and 
office time (hours)     








 (1.5) (5) (44) = 330 









 (1) (5) (44) = +220 
C.) Travel time     + Office time   = 550 
Step 5. 
Determine field hours 
for Core Positions 












Formula for Estimating Core Public Health Personnel 
(Hours) 
  Epidemiology c 1,533 -220 = 1,313 




Nurse c 1,533 -220 = 1,313 
  
 
REHS 2, a 1,533 -550 = 983 





Formula for Estimating Core Public Health Personnel 
Step 
Number 




Calculation    
Step 6. 
Determine annual 
workload hours for 
each core position in 




average of each 
activity by the target 
number of activities 
per year     
Step 7. 
Determine the number 
of core positions 
needed d     
 
 
Divide the figure in 
Step 6 by the figure in 
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